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People commonly associate resistance to oppression with political activism. I argue that 
there is a valuable kind of resistance that differs significantly from activism and is easily 
overlooked. In "quiet resistance" individuals push back against the effects of oppression on their 
personal lives by pursuing something—a project, preference, relationship, or ideal—that is 
forbidden or discouraged by the oppression they experience. Their resistance is “quiet” not in the 
sense that it literally cannot be heard, but because it does not attempt to communicate a message 
of resistance to a public audience. Quiet resistors do not have overtly political motives or 
aspirations. They resist for the sake of living a life that expresses who they are and what they 
care about in spite of or because of the risks. Aware of social pressures against their behavior, 
they have an attitude that says “to heck with that, I will not be stopped. I’m going to do it 
anyway!”. Through quiet resistance, individuals can fulfill their values and preferences in a 
context where they are unjustly pressured not to do so. As such, it can exhibit self-respect and 
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When asked to name examples of admirable resistance to oppression, many people offer 
prominent historical examples of political activism: The Women’s Suffrage Parade (1913). 
Ghandi’s Salt March (1930). The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955-1956). These extraordinary 
mass protests were highly organized and effective. They were grounded in deep commitments to 
justice and equality, had clear demands and excellent leadership, and lead to desirable political 
change, including the desegregation of public buses, the granting of women’s right to vote, and 
the liberation of India from British colonialism. In fact, people tend to assume that all valuable 
acts of resistance to oppression share the traits of political activism:  
1. They publicly and explicitly condemn a wrong or injustice 
2. They take steps to correct or ameliorate that wrong or injustice by changing aspects of 
the public sphere, and  
3. They are reasonably effective in getting their (political) message across to a public 
audience or in bringing about desirable political change 
But if you take the example of Marji from Marjane Satrapi’s autobiography Persepolis, it 
appears to have nothing in common with these paradigmatic protests. Marji is a young girl 
growing up in Iran during the Islamic Revolution. She smokes cigarettes, reads philosophy 
books, buys Iron Maiden tapes from the black market, and paints “Punk is not Dead” on the 
back of a jacket that she wears over her chador (the mandated dress-code for women in Iran).1 
                                                      




She defies sexism and tyranny as they take a toll on her day-to-day life and relationships. But, 
Marji is no political activist. She does not engage in strategic collective action, attempt to 
mobilize or educate the public in the name of justice or equality. She does not communicate her 
opposition directly to the Iranian government. She never identifies with a feminist movement. 
Moreover, her behavior is extremely ineffective in bringing about changes in Iranian law, 
politics, and culture. In fact, that is not her primary concern.  
How should we understand cases of personal defiance like Marji’s? Given the enormous 
differences between Marji’s behavior and the more familiar paradigms of political activism, can 
Marji be admired for resisting her oppression? And if so, what explains the value of her 
resistance?  
In Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Notes on the American Scene (2000), 
Adolph Reed lays the grounds for an unsympathetic analysis of Marji’s behavior. Discussing 
black youth culture, Reed argues that the creation and consumption of politically conscious rap 
music could never constitute resistance to oppression because it avoids conventional political 
action that directly challenges the state. For Reed, there is no resistance to oppression,  
that does not work to shape the official institutions of public authority that govern and 
channel people’s lives. Anything else is playacting.2   
 
Taking a line of thought analogous to Reed’s, one possible analysis of Marji’s behavior is to 
argue that, like creators and consumers of politically conscious rap, Marji’s does not attempt to 
change the official institutions of the state and public authority. Thus, Marji is not resisting her 
                                                      
2 Reed, Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene, p.167-170. 
Also see Shelby, “Impure Dissent: Hip Hop and the Political Ethics of Black Urban Youth”, 17. 
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oppression, but rather, avoiding genuine resistance to it. As Reed would put it, Marji’s behavior 
is playacting resistance, it is “posturing posing as politics”.3  Call this the Posturing Argument.   
A second possible response, this time more sympathetic, goes as follows: Marji’s acts are 
typical of rebellious teenagers, who are generally impulsive, naïve, and irrational. Due to no fault 
of her own, she fails to resist effectively, and cannot reasonably be expected to. She is too young, 
ignorant, or incapable. Call this the Paternalistic Argument.  
The Paternalistic Arguments recalls lively debates in the literature about the behavior of 
enslaved Africans in the United States. Bernard Boxill describes cases where slaves “broke their 
tools, pretended to be sick, stole from the master, acted stupid, were always late”.4  Boxill, along 
with others including Howard McGary and Bill Lawson, argue that such behavior suggests that 
slaves resisted by “doing what they could to frustrate the point of their oppression”. 5 Conversely, 
theorists such as Stanly Elkin argue that the restrictions on the behavior of slaves were so tightly 
controlled that they completely damaged them. They became childlike and incapable of resisting. 
As Elkins controversially describes them,  
The typical plantation slave, was docile but irresponsible…chronically given to lying and 
stealing; his behavior was full of infantile silliness and his talk with childish 
exaggerations. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and childlike 
attachment: it was indeed this childlike quality that was the key to his being.6  
 
                                                      
3 Reed, Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene, p. 170. Also 
see Shelby, “Impure Dissent: Hip Hop and the Political Ethics of Black Urban Youth”, 17. 
 
4 Boxill, “The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist their own Oppression”, p. 8.  
 
5 Boxill, “The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist their own Oppression”, p. 8. 
  
6 Elkins, Slavery, p. 82.  
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Consistent with the Paternalistic Argument, a third possibility is to argue that small acts 
of rebellion like Marji’s are valuable training for mature political engagement later on in life, and 
may even raise others’ consciousness and inspire them to take political action. On this 
argument—call it the Political Potential Argument—Marji’s behavior is politically efficacious 
because it can lead to desirable political change and more traditional forms of political activism 
down the line.  This response resembles the instrumental justification of black arts and cultural 
production often used by the Black Arts Movement’s (a.k.a “BAM”, the “aesthetic and spiritual 
sister” of the Black Power Movement).7 Amiri Baraka, a founder, for instance, defends black art 
for its potential to raise public consciousness, and mobilize the masses.8 And BAM poet, Larry 
Neil defends the Black Arts Movement as a mouthpiece for the political values and aspirations of 
the Black Power Movement. As Neil describes it, among BAM’s fundamental tenets is to 
“advocate a cultural revolution in art and ideas”, “destroy the White Western aesthetic”, and 
“establish a whole new system”. 9   
This dissertation questions the assumptions underlying the Posturing, Paternalistic, and 
Political Potential Arguments—namely, that all valuable resistance publically and explicitly 
condemns a wrong or injustice, takes steps to reduce or eliminate that wrong or injustice from 
public life, and is effective in bringing about desirable changes at the level of official authority 
and institutions. I absolutely do not wish to weaken or question the value of political activism! 
However, I believe that there is great value to be had in personal defiance. Moreover, oppression 
                                                      
7 Larry Neil, “The Black Arts Movement”, Drama Review, Summer 1968, p. 1.  
 
8 Amiri Baraka, A Nation Within A Nation”, 1999. Also see Shelby, “Impure Dissent: Hip Hop 
and the Political Ethics of Black Urban Youth”, p. 17.  
 
9 Larry Neil, “The Black Arts Movement”, Drama Review, Summer 1968, p. 1.  
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is not only a matter of official institutions, but runs deep into ordinary everyday life. It is 
possible to resist the local effects of oppression on personal life without attempting to incite 
social or political change.  
There is such a thing as personal resistance to oppression, and it is valuable. In the pages 
that follow, I develop an account of one kind of personal resistance, which I call “quiet 
resistance”. In quiet resistance, individuals push back against the effects of oppression on their 
personal lives by pursuing something—a project, preference, relationship, or ideal—that is 
forbidden or discouraged by the oppression they experience (recall Marji’s behavior in 
Persepolis). Quiet resistance is “quiet” because it does not attempt to communicate any explicit 
messages of protest to a public audience. Quiet resistors do not have overtly political motives or 
aspirations. They are not primarily concerned with the impact their behavior has on the public or 
those in power. Rather, their primary concern is to lives that are expressive of who they are and 
what they value, oppression notwithstanding. When it exposes one to oppression-related harms, 
this becomes a courageous and self-respecting act of rebellion.  
In “Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence”, Thomas Hill provides us with stepping 
stones for an account of the value of quiet resistance, and an alternative take on the example of 
Marji. Hill argues that the value of protest cannot be reduced to its utility. Symbolic acts of 
protest, such as leaving a dinner party in protest of a colleague’s openly racist comments, or, as 
Tommie Shelby suggests, consuming, creating, and distributing politically conscious rap music, 
can be valuable independently of their social influence or political impact. They can be valuable 
for their expressive dimensions-that is for their expressions of solidarity with the oppressed, of 
disloyalty to the oppressors, or allegiance with the good against evil.  
 6 
Like Hill, my interest is in the non-consequentialist value of quiet resistance. Namely, I 
see value in some quiet resistance even if it will not ultimately result in more traditional political 
participation (although, I do not deny that it may also have instrumental value).  Quiet resistance 
is an expression of one’s refusal to be unjustly stopped from living a life that represents who one 
is and what one cares about. However, I do not think that quiet resistance is merely symbolic. 
Through quiet resistance, individuals don’t merely express their allegiances, they do things—
they live out their values and fulfill their preferences in a context where they are unjustly 
prevented from doing so. As such, quiet resistance is an enactment of one’s self-respect and 
courage, and sometimes it can be a source of meaning in life.  
A note on methodology: I build my conception of resistance out of concrete examples 
and testimonies drawn from a diverse array of cultural and geographical contexts, including 
those from my own life. My methodology is bottom-up. Instead of formulating an idealized 
“essence” of resistance and then picking out examples to fit a fixed model, I start with the 
examples, and then theorize from them using well established concepts in normative ethics. This 
methodology reflects my commitment to producing philosophical work that is inclusive and 
grounded in the real-world. Finally, against an intellectual tradition of outsiders looking in on the 
lives of marginalized people, the point of view I contribute is one of an insider looking out.  
 
 














CHAPTER 1: OPPRESSION 
 
It has become fashionable to talk about oppression. But, what is oppression and why should 
we talk about it? “Oppression” isolates a distinctive kind of wrong, one that is uniquely 
damaging and carries special normative weight. The concept is a vital tool for activists and 
theorists working to understand, and to change, unjust social conditions.  But, its meaning can be 
difficult to grasp. For one, the term gets used to describe many different kinds of conditions. 
Sometimes it refers to political injustices—“Jim Crow laws were oppressive”. Other times, it 
describes moral wrongs in interpersonal relationships—“he was oppressing me!”. And yet other 
times it refers to social mores and practices—“beauty pageants oppress women”.  Second, 
oppression is often confused with other forms of harm and suffering. The charge that some group 
of people is oppressed (e.g. that women are oppressed) is often taken to be a denial of the 
suffering of another group (e.g. the denial of the suffering of men).10 However, as Marilyn Frye 
rightly notes, “human beings can be miserable without being oppressed, and it is perfectly 
consistent to deny that a person or group is oppressed without denying that they have feelings or 
that they suffer”.11 Third, many different kinds of people are said to be oppressed including 
                                                      
10 Marilyn Frye makes this point in The Politics of Reality (1983). 
 
11 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality, p. 2 
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women, Blacks, Chicanos, Arabs, Muslims, queer and transgender people, refugees, people 
living in war or under tyranny, the elderly, the poor, the working class, the disabled, and the 
mentally ill. What conditions could possibly be shared by all of these groups? 12 Indeed, Iris 
Young and Sally Haslanger both insist that not much can be said about oppression in general or 
a priori, understanding it requires careful attention to real-world cases. Fourth, people can fail to 
recognize oppression because they fail to see how its harms are interconnected. As I’ll explain, 
oppression’s harms are systemic—they cannot be understood in isolation of our social, political 
and economic practices and institutions. Finally, there are several kinds of oppression, some of 
them are economic or political in character. But, others are psychological and need not involve 
economic exploitation, political inequality, or physical harm.13 
What do we mean when we say someone is being oppressed? The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a general explanation of oppression, one that can serve as a helpful backdrop for 
understanding the central topic of this dissertation—namely, a phenomenon that I’ll call “quiet 
resistance” to oppression. The account that follows is not novel, but draws from a wide survey of 
influential accounts in the literature.  
 
                                                      
12In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Marion Young argues that it is impossible to 
provide a single set of criteria to account for all conditions of oppression. There are far too many 
differences between the groups that are said to be oppressed, and the social and historical 
contexts in which they live, for there to be a definition capable of accounting for them all. Any 
strict definition of oppression is bound to exclude some groups that should count as oppressed, or 
some experiences that should count as oppressive. For Young, cases of oppression may share a 
family resemblance, but there are no necessary features that are present consistently in all of 
them. Young is right that we should try to avoid providing an overly narrow characterization of 
oppression. However, there is also reason to avoid providing an overly vague or nonspecific 
characterization In The Politics of Reality, Marilyn Frye stresses the importance of having a clear 
and sharp understanding of the concept, so that it remains useful and does not become “stretched 
to meaninglessness”. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 40. 
 
13 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, p. 22. 
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What is it Like to Be Oppressed?  
 
A good entry into the topic of oppression is to consider how it is experienced. What is it like 
to be oppressed? If anything can be said about a common experience of oppression, what is that 
experience?14 In the most general sense, the common experience of oppression is that of being 
unjustly blocked and molded to fit within socially constructed forces and barriers. As Marilyn 
Frye puts it,  
the experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is confined and shaped by 
forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and hence avoidable, but are 
systematically related to each other in such a way as to catch one between and among them 
and restrict or penalize motion in any direction. It is the experience of being caged in: all 
avenues, in every direction, are blocked or booby trapped.15  
 
The experience is, as the root of the word suggests, the experience of being “pressed”,  
something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers which are so 
related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion or 
mobility. Mold. Immobilize. Reduce.16 
 
Note that the quotations from Frye stress the systemic nature of oppression. Oppression is not an 
isolated episode of harm, but rather, a system of harms working together to reduce and 
immobilize people. I will return to this point later. For now, the concepts are particularly useful 
for explaining what it is like to be oppressed: the double-bind, double-consciousness and false 
consciousness.   
 
                                                      
 
15 Frye, The Politics of Reality, “Oppression”, p. 4. Even Iris Young claims that in the most 
abstract sense, oppressed people do share a common condition. All oppressed persons are, in 
some way or another, inhibited from developing and expressing themselves, “In the most general 
sense, all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their 
capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings”. Young, “Five Faces of Oppression”, 
p. 4. 
 
16 Frye, The Politics of Reality, p. 2.  
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The Double Bind 
 
One of the most mundane and ubiquitous features of the experience of oppression is the 
double bind. A person is in a double bind when they have very few viable options and all expose 
them to penalty, censure, or deprivation. 17 One example Frye uses to illustrate the double bind is 
the implicit social requirement upon many women to always “smile and be cheerful”: If we 
comply, Frye contends, “we signal our docility and our acquiescence in our situation”.18 Our 
pleasantness says to others that we need not be taken as serious contenders in a conversation or 
debate. We get talked over and interrupted in meetings and social events, and we signal our 
openness to being flirted with or simply ignored. On the other hand, if we are not bubbly and 
cheerful, we are easily perceived as mean, bitter, angry, difficult, uptight, or unpleasant to work 
with. This can alienate women, cost them their jobs, and expose them to verbal or physical attack 
and harassment.   
As another example, consider how societal restrictions on female sexuality put many 
women in a bind where neither sexual activity nor sexual inactivity is OK. Have sex and one 
may be considered “loose, unprincipled, or a whore…treated as an easy lay by men...scorn[ed] 
by her more restricted female friends”. 19 Abstain and one may be considered frigid, uptight, a 
man-hater, and constantly pestered by men who “try to persuade her into it and pressure her to 
‘relax’ and ‘let her hair down’”. Hence, one is caught between social barriers and all of one’s 
options expose one to criticism.  
                                                      
17 Frye, Politics of Reality, “Oppression”, p. 4.  
 
18 Frye, Politics of Reality, “Oppression”, p. 2. 
 
19 Frye, Politics of Reality, “Oppression”, p. 3. 
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Sandra Bartky draws on the idea of the double bind in explaining how stereotypes about 
masculinity and femininity can socially penalize women’s autonomy by rendering it 
“unfeminine”,    
We [women] cannot be autonomous, as men are thought to be autonomous, without in 
some sense ceasing to be women. When one considers how interwoven are traditional 
female stereotypes with traditional female roles—and these, in turn, with the ways in 
which we are socialized—all this is seen in an even more sinister light: White women, at 
least, are psychologically conditioned not to pursue the kind of autonomous development 
that is held by the culture to be a constitutive feature of masculinity.20 
 
  Summing up her account of psychological oppression, Bartky writes,   
to be psychologically oppressed is to be caught in the double bind of a society which both 
affirms my human status and at the same time bars me from exercise of many of those 
typically human functions that bestow that status.21 (my italics).  
 
In “Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s “Oppression””, Alison Bailey rightly notes 
the limitations of using the concept of the double bind to describe the experience of oppression. 
She writes,  
[A]lthough the double-bind may be a characteristic of an individual’s experiences of 
oppression, it is not the defining feature.22  
 
Everyone belongs to several different social groups, some may be oppressed and others non-
oppressed (I’ll turn to the group-specific nature of oppressive harms shortly). Thus, individuals 
(even those that belong to many of the same groups) will experience different effects of 
oppression, and they will experience them in different degrees. The strength of any given double 
bind, then, will depend on which oppressive conditions are present in a person’s life, “how many 
                                                      
20 Bartky, On Psychological Oppression, p. 25. 
 
21 Bartky, On Psychological Oppression, p. 22. 
 
22 Bailey, “Privilege”, p. 106. 
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conditions are present, how long they are present, and whether the individual is privileged in 
ways that might weaken or mediate the binds”.23    
Double-Consciousness 
 
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. Dubois described another ubiquitous feature of the 
experience of oppression (in particular, Dubois described the experiences of Blacks in America). 
He called it “double-consciousness”,  
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s 
self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks 
on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, 
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.24 
 
Double-consciousness describes the inner strife experienced by many oppressed persons who are 
constantly made to look at themselves through the eyes of their oppressors and to constantly 
measure themselves up to the standards of an oppressive society.   
The idea of double-consciousness has been highly influential. In On Psychological 
Oppression, Sandra Bartky applies it to the experience of women in patriarchal societies. She 
describes the experience of being sexually objectified as one of being made to see herself 
through the eyes of men, measuring herself up to their standards, their way of seeing the world,     
It is a fine spring day, and with an utter lack of self-consciousness, I am bouncing down 
the street. Suddenly I hear men’s voices. Catcalls and whistles fill the air…I have been 
made into an object…they could, after all, have enjoyed me in silence…But I must be 
made to know that I am a “nice piece of ass”: I must be made to see myself as they see 
me.25 
 
                                                      
23 Bailey, “Privilege”, p. 106. 
 
24 DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk. 
 
25 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, “On Psychological Oppression”, p.27.  
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Like the double bind, double consciousness is a characteristic of the experience of oppression, 
but it is not a defining feature.  
False Consciousness 
Another characteristic, but not defining, feature of the experience of oppressed persons is 
what some theorists call “false consciousness”. False consciousness names the inability of many 
oppressed persons to see their situation as wrong or unjust, because they are compelled not to. If 
they do recognize that they are being harmed, people who suffer false consciousness will write it 
off as an episode of misfortune, or the result of a personal flaw or neurosis. They are unable to 
see their subordination as a social injustice with economic, political, or social causes beyond 
their immediate control.  As Sandra Bartky explains,  
More often than not, we live out [our oppression] in a mystified way: What we are 
enduring we believe to be entirely intrapsychic in character, the result of immaturity, 
maladjustment, or even neurosis.26 
 
The oppressed may even come to identify with and value their oppression, participating in it 
willingly. This maintains the apparent legitimacy of oppression, serving 
to make the work of domination easier by breaking the spirit of the dominated and by 
rendering them incapable of understanding the nature of those agencies responsible for 
their subjugation. This allows those who benefit from the established order of things to 
maintain their ascendancy with more appearance of legitimacy and with less recourse to 
overt acts of violence than they might otherwise require. 27 
 
In his 1983 letter to Franz Mehrig, Engles false consciousness was to describe the state of 
mind of factory workers in capitalist societies, who embody the ideology of the ruling class 
willingly.  Capitalists depend on the exploitation of workers to make their profit. But, under the 
influence of capitalist ideology, workers tend to believe, falsely, that they are benefiting from the 
                                                      
26 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, “On Psychological Oppression”, p. 25. 
 
27 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, “On Psychological Oppression”, p. 23. 
 14 
work. Instead of revolting, they continue working and advancing the goals of their own 
exploitation, even coming to valorize and identify with it.  
In The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill investigated the question of why women in 
his society seemed to voluntarily submit to their oppression. Although he never uses the term 
“false-consciousness”, he described the women of his society as being rendered, due to their 
education and social conditioning, unable to see their social conditions as unjust.  Women are 
lead to believe that their subordination is natural and right, and denied opportunities to think 
otherwise. They do not have, Mill notes, the equal liberty to develop their talents and their 
capacities for thought and action, and all this prevents them from resisting their oppression.  
 Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All men, 
except the most brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly connected to them, not  
a forced slave but a willing one, not a slave merely, but a favorite. They have therefore 
put everything in practice to enslave their minds. The masters of all other slaves rely, for 
maintaining obedience, on fear; either fear of themselves or religious fears. The masters 
of women wanted more than simply obedience, and they turned the whole force of 
education to effect their purpose. All women are brought up from the very earliest of 
years in the belief that their ideal character is the very opposite to that of men; not self-
will, and government by self-control, but submission and yielding to the control of others. 
All the moralities tell them that it is the duty of women, and all the current 
sentimentalities that it is their nature, to live for others; to make complete abnegation of 
themselves.28 
 
Material and Psychological Harms 
 
It should be evident from the discussions so far that a person’s oppression can consist in 
several different kinds of harms. Ann Cudd divides the harms experienced by oppressed people 
into two categories: material and psychological. Material harms occur when a person’s physical 
being is harmed or their material resources unjustly damaged or restricted. They include 
                                                      
28 Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, “The Subjection of Women”, p. 132.  
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economic deprivation, exploitation, and various forms of physical violence and confinement.29 
Psychological harms occur when a person is harmed emotionally, diminished in their self-
esteem, or in their ability to think and deliberate rationally.30 Psychological harms can manifest 
in internalized intimations of inferiority, alienation, and servility (i.e. the undervaluation or 
misunderstanding of one’s equal moral status). Bartky describes the psychological experience of 
oppression as one of being weighed down in one’s mind and broken in spirit, 
To be psychologically oppressed is to be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a 
harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem.31  
 
When we describe someone as oppressed, what we typically mean is that they unjustly 
suffer what Cudd calls “material harms”—economic exploitation, political inequality, physical 
violence or deprivation. However, material and psychological harms mutually exacerbate and 
reinforce one another, and they can have the same institutional causes. In On Psychological 
Oppression, Sandra Bartky notes that some people only experience psychological oppression 
without experiencing economic or political injustices (although, as Bartky admits, this is not the 
case for many oppressed groups). 
So far, I have been describing the experience of being oppressed as one involving 
material and psychological harms, double binds, double consciousness, and false consciousness. 
The question remains: what makes the experiences I’ve been describing experiences of 
oppression? Some readers might be thinking: Anyone—oppressed or not—can have experiences 
                                                      
29 Cudd’s examples of material harms include impoverishment, imprisonment, enslavement, 
ethnic cleansing, lynching, rape, among others. Cudd 2006.  
 
30 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 24. 
 
31 Bartky, Femininity and Domination, “On Psychological Oppression”, p. 22. 
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like the ones I have been describing. What makes these experiences of oppression rather than 
some other kind of harm or injustice?  
What distinguishes oppression from other harms and injustices is that oppressive harms 
are suffered by people because of their membership in groups of low social esteem. Hence, they 
are unjust group-specific harms. Moreover, oppressive harms mutually reinforce and exacerbate 
each other, working together in a system. Unlike other harms, they are not episodic or avoidable. 
Hence, the systemic character of oppression. Finally, they are the result of oppressive 
ideologies—namely, ideologies that contain false and denigrating images and information about 
certain groups of people. Hence, the ideological character of oppression. I will return to these 
points shortly.   
The Experiences of Quiet Resistors 
 
Let’s now pause to consider some examples of the experiences of oppression that can fuel 
quiet resistance. To be clear, the examples that follow are meant to convey experiences of a case 
of oppression, not episodes of quiet resistance (examples of quiet resistance can be found in 
chapter 2). I’ll refer to the protagonists of the following examples as “proto quiet-resistors”.   
1. Amy is a well-to-do debutante from a small town in the American South. During her time 
in college, Amy developed a strong passion for engineering but, with the encouragement 
of her family, has regretfully decided not to pursue it. Her community thinks that 
engineering is the proper job for a man and women should use their college years to find 
a suitable husband. Pursuing engineering would mean spending long hours alone in her 
room working on problem sets, making her less attractive and accessible to the kinds of 
suitors that her family is pushing her to consider—rich men who will make sure she’ll 
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“live like a princess” and never have to work. After all, her mother says, “you’ll waste 
your beauty hiding it away behind those books!”.    
2. In the autobiographical novel and film Persepolis, Marji is growing up during the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in the 1980s. Music is strictly forbidden by the regime, which brutally 
punishes violations. But, tapes can still be bought on the black market. Very precariously, 
Marji buys an Iron Maiden record from a street vendor and later presses the words “Punk 
is not Dead” on to the back of her jacket, which she wears over her long black chador. 
This provokes the rage of her community leaders.   
3. Omar is a conservative man who knows he is gay, but feels deeply ashamed of it and 
prays that his romantic feelings for other men will one day disappear. But, Omar is in 
love with Laith, who loves Omar back. When he was given the opportunity to have a 
relationship with Laith, Omar vowed never to do such a thing because it would, in his 
view, be “wrong and irresponsible”. He especially fears disappointing his family, losing 
his job, and suffering from the backlash he would receive from his community if they 
were to find out.  
4. Sophia is a married woman with kids. She has dedicated her whole life to caring for her 
family, whom she loves. With pressure from her traditional husband and community, 
she’s given up on her hobbies and social life in order to devote herself more fully to their 
care. The other day while shuttling her son to Tae Kwon Do, Sophia saw an ad on the 
bulletin board for a women’s book club. “That sounds so fun!” she thought to herself, 
recalling the joy she once felt reading literature in her youth, and imagining all the 
interesting women she might get to meet. But instead of taking down the information, she 
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lets out a sigh and tries to forget about it and move on. She knows her husband will never 
allow it. He’ll even mock her for considering it.  
5. Mona is a hairy woman by most Western standards. It doesn’t bother her to be hairy, all 
the lovely women in her community are hairy. In fact, she doesn’t think body hair should 
matter at all and prefers not to give it a second thought. But, because she’ll seem “gross” 
or “unprofessional” to others, especially the White people who employ her, and because 
all the other women in her community do it, she still pays a monthly fortune for 
excruciatingly painful and lengthy sessions of laser hair-removal.      
Unjust Group-Specific Harm 
 
As I mentioned earlier, one thing that distinguishes oppression from other injustices is that 
individuals suffer its harms in virtue of their membership in a group or category of people of low 
social esteem.32 The harms of oppression are, in other words, “group-specific”. This means that 
when someone is picked out for harmful treatment, if the treatment is oppressive, then she 
receives it not solely because of who she is as an individual, but because of her membership in a 
group or category of people. For instance, if the treatment she receives is sexist, it must be the 
case that she is picked out for such treatment in virtue of her belonging to the group of all 
women whose members, in the given social context, are considered collectively deserving of 
such treatment.33 Hence, a harm counts as oppressive only if it results from the recognition that 
the individual in question is a member of a group or category of people. As Carol Hay puts it,  
Oppressive harms come about as a result of judgments that concern the qualities that all 
members of a group are presumed to share, or that concern what such people are 
                                                      
32 Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism, p. 3 
 
33 Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism, p. 3.  
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presumed to deserve. A harm count as oppressive only if it results from the recognition 
that the individual in question is a member of a certain group or category of people.34 
 
I would add that oppressive harms may also come about as a result of judgements that concern 
the proper roles or functions that all members of a group are expected to play in society. To take 
one of our examples, Amy is being blocked from pursuing her interest in engineering. This is 
harmful to her not merely because of the emotional pain it may cause her, but because it prevents 
her from doing something that is important to her, and that could partially constitute her self-
respect. But, when she is pressured by her community to give up on engineering, it is not entirely 
because of who she is as an individual, as Amy with her particular qualities, talents, merits, and 
demerits. Rather, she is being restricted because she is a woman and, because “engineering is not 
the proper job for any woman”.  The harmful treatment is directed at Amy because of the social 
group she belongs to (i.e. the group of all woman) and because of a network of widely held 
judgements about the qualities that all women share, the treatment that women deserve, the roles 
that they should play, and expectations of appropriate behavior for them.   
Similarly, Sophia and Mona are being harmed because they are women, and because 
“good mothers and wives sacrifice themselves for their families”, and because of ideas about 
female professionalism and cleanliness. Moreover, it is because he is a man and “real men are 
heterosexual” that Omar is being prevented from loving Laith. And, it is because she is a citizen 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran that Marji is being denied the freedom to enjoy punk rock.  
Social Groups 
I’ve been explaining that oppressive harms are directed at individuals in virtue of their 
membership in a social group. But, what is a social group and what kind of social groups are 
                                                      
34 Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, Feminism, p. 3.  
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subject to oppression? Is any social group a viable candidate for oppression? For the purposes of 
our current discussion, I embrace Iris Young’s characterization of a social group as a collective 
of people bound together by a shared culture and sense of identity,  
A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by 
cultural forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with 
one another because of their similar experience or way of life, which prompts them to 
associate with one another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a 
different way.35  
 
Carol Hay makes two important qualifications on the condition that oppressive harms are 
group-specific. First, she notes that the group must be one that has a relative lack of social 
esteem, power, or authority. Second, if someone is harmed by oppression, the harm they suffer is 
always unjust, wrong, or illegitimate in some other way. As Hay writes,  
The harms of oppression are not inevitabilities like aging, disease, or death; oppression is 
not a necessary aspect of the human condition.36 
 
Some groups of relatively low social esteem may suffer group-specific harms, but those harms 
may not be oppressive, because they may not be unjust.  For instance, prisoners are 
systematically restricted by being imprisoned, but if these restrictions are the result of just 
punishment, then they are not oppressive.  
Alison Bailey makes two other important qualifications about the group-specific nature 
of oppression. First, she argues that oppression is not a unified phenomenon, because group 
differences in race, ethnicity, gender, class, or sexual orientation, and others cut across individual 
lives. Individuals always belong to more than one social group, and some of the groups an 
individual belongs to may be privileged while others are oppressed. This means that oppression 
                                                      
35 Young, “Five Faces of Oppression”, p. 7.  
 
36 Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism, p. 5.  
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and privilege can be experienced simultaneously. Second, Bailey notes that understanding the 
group-specific nature of oppression does not require social groups to have fixed boundaries. 
Rather, to understand oppression, it is important to recognize that social groups lack a rigid 
definition, and that this is what allows the powerful to define and control the construction of 
social categories. Bailey provides an example concerning the invention of “white” as a racial 
category to promote political ends,   
The word “white” began appearing in legal documents around 1680 as a direct result of 
legislation enforcing the hereditary bond servitude of Negroes, antimiscegenation laws, 
and new anti-Negro attitudes. In time, the idea of a homogeneous “white” race was 
adopted as a political means of generating cohesion among European explorers, traders, 
migrants, and settlers of eighteenth-century North America. The borders constructed 
between races have never been static…[they] historically shift to preserve power and 
privilege of those who have the authority to define who counts as white.37 
 
Structural Causes of Oppression 
 
What, or whom, causes oppression? The most familiar understanding of oppression is one 
that implies an agent or group of agents (an “oppressor” or “oppressor-group”) unjustly using 
their power to subordinate or constrain another agent or group (the “oppressed”).  Sally 
Haslanger calls this source of oppressive power “agential”, indicating that the harm that occurs is 
the result of the actions of a responsible agent.  
There is no denying that there are people in our society that abuse their power to reduce, 
immobilize and constrain others. However, the causes of modern day oppressions are 
predominantly “structural”—they result from collective daily participation in unjust social, 
economic, or political practices, laws, and institutions. Individuals whose daily actions contribute 
                                                      
37 Bailey, “Privilege”, p. 107.  
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to the maintenance and reproduction of oppression are usually, as Iris Young puts it, just “doing 
their jobs or living their lives”. 38 In sum,   
In its extended structural sense, oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some 
groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-
meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural 
features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms—in short the normal 
processes of everyday life. We cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid 
of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically 
reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.39 
 
Some readers may want to deny that the proto quiet-resistors in the earlier examples are 
being oppressed because no overt violence or coercion is being used, or because their struggles 
are not the result of the malicious intentions of specific people. For instance, no one puts a gun to 
Mona’s head and says “you must get laser hair removal treatments, or else!” Family members 
who make sure to let Mona know when it’s time for another session of hair-removal have no ill 
will towards her, they just want her to continue looking her best. Similarly, when Amy the 
aspiring engineer is told to give up on her interest in engineering, it is all in the name of making 
sure her life is socially successful and her future is taken care of. Similar things can be said about 
Omar, whose community would only censure him because they want him to live a pious life and 
about Sophia, whose husband might claim he only wants the best for his family. Understanding 
oppression as a structural phenomenon can help us understand that the proto-quiet resistors are 
being oppressed, even though they may not be the victims of deliberately malicious treatment.   
Marilyn Frye uses the metaphor of a birdcage to illustrate the structural nature of oppression, and 
to explain why it can be difficult to recognize individual experiences as oppressive. If you only 
ever focused on one wire of a bird cage at a time, even if you looked very diligently, you will 
                                                      
38 Young, “Five Faces of Oppression, p. 6. 
 
39 Young, Five Faces of Oppression, p. 5.  
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never be able to see how the individual wires work together to confine the occupant of the cage. 
You will assume that the bird could just fly out around the wire.  It is only when we take a step 
back and observe all of the wires in the cage together that we can see how the individual wires 
form a system of barriers that function collectively to restrict the freedom of the bird. Similarly, 
it is very difficult to recognize oppression if we focus exclusively on one particular instance of 
harm, restriction or frustration, or, if we only focused on a single social, political, or economic 
practice or institution. Taken by themselves, individual experiences of harm or frustration may 
not seem oppressive—it might not seem like they are capable of limiting anyone’s freedom in 
any significant way. As Frye suggests, it is only when we shift the level of our perception from 
the individual cases to see how they are related in a social, political, and economic system will 
we see how oppression works.  
As examples of structural causes of oppression (wires on the birdcage) consider cases of 
explicit legal discrimination, such as Jim Crow laws that established racial segregation in 
America. But structural causes needn’t be legislative. Distribution and construction of public 
space can also be oppressive. For instance, the physically disabled are unjustly immobilized 
when buildings are constructed with no access ramps. This can occur not necessarily due to the 
animosity of any particular persons towards the disabled, but simply because of architects’ and 
city planners’ negligence or indifference.40 Moreover, structural oppression can occur through 
widely shared beliefs and ideas. Stereotypes and ideals about women’s roles and responsibilities 
in family and in public life can be oppressive when they impose disproportionate burdens on 
women or wrongly deny them opportunities. Finally, widely distributed media and products can 
                                                      
40 Haslanger, “Oppressions”, Resisting Realities, p. 315. 
 
 24 
be oppressive when they promote negative representations of certain kinds of people, insulting 
members of those groups, fostering contempt or hatred towards them, and distorting people’s 
judgments.41   
A Brief Note on Ideology 
Agential and structural forces of oppression work together and are mutually reinforcing. 
Tyranny, for instance, is oppressive not only because tyrants immorally and intentionally cause 
harm to others but because the entire governmental structure of tyranny is unjust—i.e. its laws 
and policies do not count individuals as moral equals, its distribution of power and resources 
depend on making problematic distinctions between the people, and its practices and institutions 
collectively work to maintain an unjust imbalance of power. Hence, the deliberate actions of the 
tyrant need not be the sole cause of the oppression of the people in a tyranny. Rather, the 
oppression can be the result of both agent and structural power. Indeed, even benign tyrants can 
still rule in an oppressive regime.42  
Several theorists have described the forms of oppression that are characteristic of the modern 
world as ideological.43 The meaning and utility of the term “ideology” is controversial and I do 
not wish to defend it here.44 Nevertheless, I think the concept of ideology can be useful for 
                                                      
41 Haslanger, “Oppressions”, Resisting Realities, p. 315. 
 
42 Haslanger, “Oppressions”, Resisting Realities, p. 314.  
 
43 Tommie Shelby states that ideology and its critique are “indispensable for understanding and 
resisting the forms of oppression that are characteristic of the modern world”. Shelby, “Ideology, 
Racism, and Critical Social Theory”, p. 154. Also see Haslanger & Chambers, 2017.  
 
44 There are many different uses of the term and the literature on ideology is vast. The term has 
strong associations with Marx and Engles (1845/1998). But also see Tommie Shelby 2003 and 
Haslanger and Chambers 2017.   
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explaining how agent and structural forces of oppression work together. That is, it can help to 
further illustrate oppression’s systemic nature.   For the purposes of our discussion, let’s assume 
the following understanding of ideology:  
An ideology is a complex of socially shared and constructed ideas—social meanings, 
symbols, beliefs, narratives, ideals, heuristics, principles and the like—that form a 
systematic outlook on the world. 45 
 
Ideologies are oppressive when they contain false and degrading beliefs and 
representations of certain groups or categories of people and when they function to establish and 
justify unjust relationships of power and subordination. Powerful ideologies, like racism, sexism, 
and Islamism, are widely held and deeply entrenched, usually to the point of being accepted as 
so-called common sense.46 To the people who accept them, they have strong justificatory power, 
even in the face of facts and strong countervailing evidence.47 They get “baked into” a culture, so 
to speak, directly and indirectly influencing social, political, and economic mores, practices, and 
institutions, and providing context and meaning for individual actions and self-conceptions.48 . 
                                                      
45 I will not defend this definition of ideology, since I think it is intuitive enough. But for a more 
complete definition of ideology see Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory”.   
 
46 Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory”, p. 154.  
 
47 Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory”, p. 159.  
 
48 The notion of ideology as a complex of ideas can be illustrated with an example provided by 
Tommie Shelby: Consider the view that “blacks are inherently of low intelligence”. This idea is 
part of a racist ideology. For instance, it connects to other widely held presumptions about black 
people, “[their] laziness, aggressiveness, and unreliability… beliefs about their natural 
musicality, athletic talent, and sexual prowess. Such beliefs are in turn based on the view that 
these and other such socially significant characteristics are transmitted through biological 
reproduction. This black essentialism is related to assumptions about the continental origins and 
physical characteristics of various subpopulations in humanity, which are often treated as 
hierarchically ordered…with blacks invariably at the bottom”. Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and 
Critical Social Theory”, p. 159. 
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How are oppressive ideologies perpetuated? Through collective participation in the 
mores, practices, and institutions that support and represent them, and through the social 
sanctions that incentivize participation. Social sanctions are forms of reward or censure that 
provide compelling incentives for people to conform to the ideology and reproduce the 
oppression. Simply by participating in their own society’s mores, the subordinated and the 
privileged alike can act as ideology police, dealing out censures and punishments to those who 
deviate or refuse to conform and honors and rewards to those who comply, identify with, or 
reproduce the oppression. The sanctions are enforced unknowingly and even willingly by 
ordinary well-meaning people. Even those with deep commitments to justice and equality might 
hardly notice their participation in the social mores that sustain and reproduce ideological 
oppressions.49  
The proto quiet-resistors in my examples are oppressed by ideologies that are deeply 
entrenched in the cultures to which they belong. Consider how the harms and blockages that they 
face can be traced back to and justified by complexes of ideas about the role of people like them 
in society.  For instance, the bias that “women are inherently care takers” is one that the people 
in Amy’s community are bound to have. This idea is a node in a web of widely held and socio-
historically constructed beliefs, ideas, and representations of women and their relationships with 
men. The idea that “women are inherently care takers” is connected, for instance, to beliefs about 
women’s care and attentiveness to others, and about men as natural providers and protectors. 
These socially shared beliefs are embedded in the behaviors and self-conceptions of men like 
Sophia’s husband, who fail to help their spouses with child care and domestic labor. Consider 
how this gender essentialism leads to the belief that women should not place much importance 
                                                      
49 Haslanger & Chambers, “Ideology and Oppression”, p. 150. 
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on their own hobbies and interests, and to other related gender stereotypes and assumptions 
about women and their position in a gender hierarchy with men at the top. These ideas and 
representations of women plus others collectively form the sexist ideology that is salient in the 
experiences of many of the women in my examples.      
The concept of ideology is a useful heuristic for our purposes because it reveals how 
agential and structural sources of oppression can be intertwined and interconnected in the same 
system of oppression. The concept of ideology, in other words, can help to explain how the wires 
in Frye’s cage work together to produce the subordination and limitation of certain people. 
Ideologies are embodied and represented both in the actions of individual agents as well as in the 
social, political, and economic structures that make up their social context.  A strong indication 
that individual actions or mores are part of the same system of oppression is that they support 
ideas that are related together in the same ideology. For examples, sexist ideology contains 
representations of women as weak, childlike, irrational, inferior, caretakers, emotional, mothers, 
self-sacrificers etc. These representations influence the behaviors of sexists and others who 
accept (knowingly or not) the ideology. But they also underpin discriminatory legislation and 
hiring practices, common tropes about women in film, advertisements, and the media, standards 
of female dress and appearance, and other aspects of our culture.    
When husbands like Sophia’s oppress their wives by constraining their mobility and 
denying them avenues of self-expression and development, they don’t it in an ideological 
vacuum. Their oppressive behavior emerges in a particular sociohistorical context, against the 
background of a given ideologically-contaminated social world with established gender-roles and 
hierarchies that permit, institutionalize, and even valorize, the subordination of women. In the 
example presented earlier, Sophia’s husband might think of his discouraging her from taking up 
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hobbies of her own as just something a good husband and father would do. After all he wears the 
pants in their relationship and if he thinks allowing Sophia to attend a women’s reading group 
will be bad for their kids, then he ought to forbid it. The ideal of “the good husband” that 
motivates and gives meaning to his behavior is part of sexist ideology. It is not due to luck or a 
quirk of his personality that this is the way he thinks. Rather, there are tropes in our culture that 
give meaning and value to such behaviors. These tropes embody part of a powerful oppressive 
ideology that establishes unjust relationships of power and domination between men and women 
in our society. 
The ideology of sexism can be found underpinning various formal and informal processes 
of ordinary social life affecting women: in the historical denial of women’s right to vote, in the 
objectification of women in the media, in past and present standards of female dress and 
appearance, norms of domestic and professional labor (i.e. in various structures of oppression) as 
well as in the actions of sexists and those who unknowingly believe and value sexism (i.e. agents 
of oppression).   
Mona, for example, feels pressure to remove her body hair even though no one openly 
tells her that she must. She is oppressed by social mores that have been shaped by sexist 
ideology. There is no identifiable agent responsible for Mona’s feeling inadequate in her natural 
body. Rather, it is the collective effect of media advertisements, popular products, and beauty 
norms that lead her to the hair removal clinic. Also consider how ideology shapes and influences 
the behaviors of agents who act to harm others on the basis of their gender. For instance, Amy’s 
mother is giving voice to a sexist ideology, and uses it to limit her daughter’s choices, when she 
says “you’ll waste your beauty hiding it away behind those books!”, even though she only has 
good intentions.  
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Self-Respect Under Oppression 
 
What is so bad about the conditions of proto-quiet resistors in the earlier examples? What do 
the oppressive harms that they suffer consist in? In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that by 
being unjustly inhibited from pursuing what they want and should be permitted to do, the proto 
quiet-resistors are obstructed from developing and maintaining self-respect.  
I embrace Thomas Hill’s account of self-respect in Servility and Self-Respect and later 
developments of the account in Self-Respect Reconsidered. According to Hill, an important part 
of what it means to have self-respect is understanding and properly valuing one’s equal status 
with others in society. An individual fails to respect herself insofar as she fails to acknowledge 
that she has certain basic moral rights, or insofar as she fails to care about those rights. In the 
later paper, Self-Respect Reconsidered, Hill adds that a fully self-respecting person not only 
appreciates her moral equality, but also develops and lives by personal standards by which she is 
prepared to judge herself and defend against violations. The self-respecting person lives a life 
that expresses not only their equality with others, but also expresses their individuality, as 
someone with personal talents, tastes, capacities, values, and standards that they are prepared to 
judge themselves by and, that they see as an important part of their lives and are willing to 
defend against unjust violations.50  
Failure to respect oneself as an individual is not necessarily a moral failing since one’s 
personal standards need not be objective or moral. They can be, for instance, standards of 
personal or artistic style or taste. They can be standards of integrity, friendliness, self-
                                                      
50 Hill, “Self-Respect Reconsidered”, p. 137.  
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sufficiency, moderation, political awareness, physical fitness or self-improvement. The person 
who respects themselves as an individual essentially,  
has a clear sense of what he values and counts important and he lives accordingly. It is 
not that he has exceptionally high ideals. Rather he has a sense, quite aside from matters 
of moral right and wrong, that certain ways of behaving are beneath him, and his acts, 
both deliberate and impulsive, never go past this line.51  
 
Importantly, for Hill having self-respect is not the same as simply feeling good about oneself or 
feeling as though one’s life is going well (i.e. having good self-esteem). It is easy to imagine a 
happy person with an inflated amount of self-esteem who does not have self-respect—They 
might break basic moral rules to make exceptions of themselves (therefore, not regarding 
themselves as an equal to others), they may be willing to do whatever it takes to please others, to 
make money, or to avoid criticism, failing to have and stand by standards or ideals of their own 
(i.e. they might “sell-out”). They might let others push them around, never standing up for 
themselves and what they want.    
Hill’s account of self-respect has been extremely influential, especially among feminist 
philosophers. Robin Dillon has expanded on Hill’s work by considering self-respect in 
oppressive contexts. Dillon argues that self-respect is socially constituted. Whether or not a 
person is able to develop and maintain it is not entirely up to them. Social conditions beyond 
one’s control, like oppression, can undermine it and make it more difficult to maintain, 
[A] person’s lacking self-respect is not simply a fact about her psychology but is an 
integral part of both her personal relationships and the social structures to which certain 
classes of persons are relegated and in which they are generally denied respect, thus 
coming to view themselves as not worthy of even their own respect.52  
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One way that someone can be inhibited from developing and maintaining self-respect is 
by being prevented from doing and engaging with the sorts of things that are important to them 
and represent or allow them to fulfill their personal standards.  Hence, someone who is forbidden 
or seriously discouraged from pursuing the things that they care about and that would make their 
life worth living for them is being forbidden from engaging in the activities that are important to 
their self-respect. Whatever one thinks self-respect is, most would agree that it is crucial for 
living a good human life. Sandra Bartky and others have described the oppressive harm of being 
prevented from having and exercising basic human capacities like self-respect as a form of 
“alienation”,  
Alienation occurs in each case when activities which not only belong to the domain of the 
self but define, in large measure, the proper functioning of this self, fall under the control 
of others. To be a victim of alienation is to have a part of one’s being stolen by another.53 
 
When oppressed persons are able to overcome the social forces undermining and 
inhibiting their self-respect, this is a great achievement. When they are able to do the things that 
are important to their sense of self-worth in spite of forces attempting to inhibit and undermine 
them from doing so, this becomes an act of insubordination. Robin Dillon puts it very 
powerfully,  
It is, of course, difficult to have recognition respect for oneself in the face of 
institutionalized denial of one’s full and equal personhood. Women’s wholeheartedly 
valuing ourselves as fully and equally persons challenges the prevailing social, political 
and economic order. Women’s self-respect is thus profoundly insubordinate. It is 
unsubordinating rebellion.54 
 
Oppressed persons can, and often do, refuse to be stopped from pursuing what they want, 
and should be permitted, to do. They can refuse to be denied the hobbies, interests, preferences, 
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and ideals that make their lives worth living for them, and that form a basis for their self-respect. 
This is just what the self-respecting person must do.  
With this brief sketch of self-respect on the table, we can now see that the proto quiet-
resistors in my examples are being undermined and inhibited in the maintenance and 
development of their self-respect. They are being materially and psychologically blocked from 
having and pursuing preferences, values, relationships, hobbies careers and other pursuits. Their 
experiences of oppression essentially take the form of being systematically obstructed from 
exploring and developing their personal values and talents and from expressing themselves 
without unwarranted interference.55 They are, in other words, being pressured to give up control 
of their own lives.  As we just saw, having self-respect requires having the liberty to explore, 
develop and live by personal standards. However, due to societal pressures, the proto quiet-
resistors are prevented from having the hobbies, careers, relationships, commitments, values and 
pursuits that would allow them to live a life that expresses their personal standards and 
aspirations. Their social conditions do not support their self-respect, and this is very bad. 
Conclusion 
 In the most abstract sense, oppression is a system of injustice wherein power is exerted to 
subordinate and constrain people on the basis of their group-membership. Two of the most 
mundane and ubiquitous features of the experience of oppression are the double bind and double-
consciousness. One of the deepest wrongs of oppression is that it can systematically undermine 
                                                      
55 If they appear to be content with their situation, it is because they do not have viable or 
meaningful alternatives, or because they have been conditioned to acquiesce or relinquish control 
of their lives to others. In effect, they are immobilized by material and psychological harms.    
Nearly 150 years ago in The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill developed an account of the 
oppression of the women of his time. The account of oppression that I’m developing here is 
amenable to Mill’s. Mill characterizes oppression as a denial of equal liberty and opportunity to 
develop one’s higher capacities for thought and action.   
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the self-respect of its victims. It can do so not only by reducing their sense of their worth as 
moral equals with others, but also by making it very difficult for them to develop and live by 
personal standards, preferences, projects, and relationships of their own.  
Individuals are oppressed if and only if they are unjustly harmed in virtue of their 
membership in a group and, if those harms are the result of a system of social, political, and 
economic institutions that tend to the denigration of that group. People can be oppressed by the 
particular agents whose actions directly support the oppressive system. And, they can be 
oppressed as a result of collective participation in unjust institutions and cultural practices.  





CHAPTER TWO: QUIET RESISTANCE 
 
The previous chapter provided an account of oppression. This chapter turns to the topic of 
resistance to oppression. More specifically, to quiet resistance to oppression, a non-political 
form of resistance that is often overlooked and undervalued. As I’ll argue, individuals quietly 
resist by pursuing personal projects, preferences, relationships, or ideals that are banned or 
discouraged by the oppression they experience. With an attitude that says, “to heck with that! I’m 
going to do this anyway”, quiet resistors act because of or in spite of the risk that they will be 
harmed as a result of their behavior. The following questions will guide my account: What is 
quiet resistance? How does it differ from activism? In what sense is quiet resistance “quiet”? 
How is it a genuine form of resistance? And, what motives are involved in an act of quiet 
resistance? And finally, why must it always be the case that quiet resistors will be exposing 
themselves to harm?   
My focus will be on acts of quiet resistance to the systemic injustices of oppression.  It is 
worth noting at the outset, however, that quiet resistance is not exclusive to contexts of 
oppression. People can quietly resist authority of different kinds, and they can do so in morally 
commendable and morally condemnable ways. Consider school kids quietly resisting by turning 
the clock hands forward while their teacher turns their back to write on the board, or teenagers 
quietly resisting their parents by violating curfew. I will not be discussing these kinds of quiet 
resistance here. However, I am interested in exploring further applications of the concept in 
future work.   
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My discussion will reveal two things about resistance to oppression in general. First, we do 
not need to conceive of our acts as defying oppression as such, like many activists do, in order 
for them to be ways in which we resist oppression. Second, there are strong reasons to resist 
oppression independently of wanting to reduce its harms, express one’s outrage over them, or 
advance political or humanitarian causes.    
What is Quiet Resistance?  
Resistance to oppression is commonly associated with activism. Activists use blatantly 
political acts—like protests, strikes, and door- to- door- canvassing to send loud and clear 
messages of resistance to oppressors and public audiences. Often through planned, collective 
action, their ultimate aim is to inspire large-scale political change. Indeed, activism for a good 
cause is a vital method of resistance, and we would stand no hope of eliminating oppression 
without it. There is, however, another important form of resistance that I want to discuss, one 
that diverges significantly from activism, but is helpfully contrasted with it. For reasons that will 
become clear later, I will call this kind of resistance “quiet resistance”. Quiet Resistance is best 
illustrated by examples. Here are a few, taken from real- life testimonies and news items.  
1. THE FEMALE BIKERS OF CAIRO: A group of women in Egypt gets together for a 
joy ride every weekend in spite of their culture’s pervasive stigma against women 
riding motorcycles. Their families are distressed by it, calling them stubborn and 
irrational. Men sexually harass them and sometimes their bikes are vandalized. They 
might not think of themselves as oppressed persons or have any theoretical 
understanding of sexism. But, they know they are violating deeply entrenched norms 
and that this is both physically and psychologically costly for them and their families. 
When asked why they ride their motorcycles when society gives them such a hard 
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time for it, they don’t say it’s to protect themselves or anyone else from harm, or to 
fulfill any moral requirement or political purpose. Instead, what they say is that they 
simply love riding their motorcycles and the distinctive thrill of their hair flying in the 
wind on the open road.56      
2. VOGUE DANCER: Houdey Saad is a gay man who has made it his mission to bring 
voguing—a unique dance style traditionally associated with queer people of color—to 
Beirut, where he lives. Lebanon is more tolerant towards LGBTQ people than other 
countries in the Middle East. But, same- sex relations were only recently 
decriminalized (July 2018) and according to a poll conducted by the Pew Research 
Center a few years ago, “79% of Lebanese agreed that gay people ‘should be rejected 
by society’”. Nevertheless, Houdey continues to spread his passion for the Vogue 
dance scene. In a recent interview, when asked to comment on how the political 
situation in Lebanon has affected his life as a gay man and dancer, he firmly says “I 
don’t think about that, I am too busy building my life and my career to care about 
politics”.57 
3. SECRET LOVERS: S and L are secret lovers. They come from different conservative 
religious backgrounds and their friends and family have deeply ingrained prejudices 
against inter- religious relationships; they would surely “disown” them for it, and may 
even harm them physically.  Accepting the burdens of concealing their true selves, 
                                                      
56 Check them out here: http://www.africanews.com/2016/06/16/egypt-s-stubborn-women-enjoy-
bike-riding-in-cairo// 
 




lying and living a double life, they’ve resolved to continue their relationship in secret 
in the interest of maintaining ties with their community. 
4. NAILPOLISH: Nayla is a stylish woman living in Saudi Arabia where in public she 
must obey the required dress code—no makeup, a veil (hijab) to cover her hair and 
neck and long black robe (abaya) that conceals her body completely. Heading out to 
the mall, Nayla knows that the religious police will surely hound her and ask her to 
go home if they catch a glimpse of her brightly colored nails. In fact, this has 
happened before. But she doesn’t give it a second thought and proceeds with her 
plans as usual, manicure intact. 58 
Although many of these examples are taken from cultural contexts that may be different 
from our own, it should be noted that quiet resistance is by no means unique to non- Western 
contexts.  Quiet Resistance is prevalent in the United States and its history too. One 
extraordinary American case, which I will just mention, is that of Admiral James Stockdale. 
Stockdale served as a fighter pilot in the Vietnam War and was captured and imprisoned for 
seven years in Hanoi. In his memoirs, Stockdale credits the Stoic teachings of Epictetus for 
helping him survive years of torture and solitary confinement, with his mind intact. For 
Stockdale, reading and reflecting on Epictetus’s works was not a political expression of protest, 
but a personal effort of survival.59 It was one of the ways in which he quietly resisted his 
oppressive treatment.     
                                                      
58 See The Guadian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/may/26/saudi-
women-religious-police and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/saudi-arabia-says-
religious-police-must-be-gentle-and-humane and Refinary29: https://www.refinery29.com/saudi-
arabia-nail-polish-police 
 
59 See Stockdale’s The Stoic Warrior’s Triad and Master of My Fate. 
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The above examples of quiet resistance may have left you with a few questions: In what 
sense is quiet resistance “quiet”? How is it resistance to oppression? And, what motives are 
involved in an act of quiet resistance? Let’s consider each question in turn.   
In What Sense is Quiet Resistance “Quiet”?  
In what sense is quiet resistance “quiet”? By “quiet” I don’t mean resistance that literally 
cannot be heard by anyone. Rather, I mean to mark a different contrast between quiet resistance 
and activism. Activism is intended to send loud and clear messages of resistance to the oppressor 
group or another public audience. In contrast, quiet resistance needn’t involve any 
communication or expression to any audience. Indeed, like the vogue dancer, some quiet 
resistors may not care about politics. They might not care if anyone else gets the message that 
they are resisting. What matters to them is that they get to uphold or pursue their personal 
project, commitment, relationship, or ideal, oppression notwithstanding.  
Quiet resistors might even intentionally keep their resistance under wraps, so as to escape 
the oppressive situation or avoid serious backlash for resisting. This is what the secret lovers do 
in my earlier example. It is also what African slaves did when they broke their tools and played 
dumb in order to conspire against the slave masters. Surely, they would have been killed if their 
masters knew what they were up to. They kept their resistance under wraps in order to achieve 
personal goals that they were forbidden from pursuing.  
Other quiet resistors might want some people to get the message that they are rebelling—
for instance African slaves sometimes used songs to communicate with one another in code—but 
their resistance is still quiet in the sense that it was communicated to particular people in their 
vicinity without attempting to draw the attention of a public group. So, resistance is quiet insofar 
as it does not constitute an attempt to make a blatant public expression of resistance or to engage 
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the attention of public audiences. This differentiates quiet resistance from activism, and 
especially paradigms of public protest, which involve sending blatant messages of resistance to 
groups of people.    
How is Quiet Resistance Genuine Resistance?  
Next, how is quiet resistance a genuine form of resistance? No one in the examples 
explicitly takes on resistance to oppression as their aim and no one makes a public expression of 
protest, nonetheless, each example involves pushing back against real oppression in the face of 
known risk. In the examples, riding a motorcycle, vogue dancing, wearing nail polish, and 
having an interreligious relationship are all acts that knowingly violate oppressive norms, and 
therefore pose obvious risks to the agents involved. This is what makes them acts of resistance—
not their proximity to paradigm cases of political activism.      
In the examples above, there are obvious oppressive forces pressuring the quiet resistors 
not to do what they set out to do—not to ride their motorcycles, vogue dance, wear nail polish, or 
pursue their relationship. But, because of the oppressive contexts in which they are acting, doing 
what they do is risky and even outright dangerous—it makes them vulnerable to social 
alienation, backlash, and further victimization.  Instead of caving in to fear and social pressure, 
they say “to heck with all of that!” and do their own thing anyway—not in a public expression of 
protest, and not in an attempt to improve the world, but for other good reasons having to do with 






What are the Motives of Quiet Resistance?  
Earlier, I stated that quiet resistors do not need to have any theoretical knowledge of 
oppression in order to resist its effects on their lives. They do not even need to care about or 
know about politics. What then, do they need to care about or know about? What must enter into 
their motivational profile if their acts are to count as acts of quiet resistance?  
Let me first say something about what the agent of quiet resistance needs to know. Quiet 
resistors must know that what they set out to do is socially discouraged and costly (i.e. that there 
are laws, customs, stereotypes, traditions or taboos against it). If they have no idea that what they 
are doing is illicit in some way, then the fact that they are acting against oppression is 
coincidental and we cannot say they are resisting oppression. If a woman from a Western country 
where it is perfectly normal for women to ride motorcycles traveled to Egypt and rode a 
motorcycle for fun not knowing that it is stigmatized for women there, her violation of Egyptian 
norms banning women from riding motorcycles is pure coincidence, and we can hardly say she 
was resisting them.  
Now, let me say something about what the agent of quiet resistance must be motivated 
by. Quiet resistors’ motivations for acting must be informed by the forbidden status of their 
pursuit in a particular way. I do not mean that they must act the way they do for the reason that it 
is forbidden, although they may. The forbidden status of their action is a reason against acting as 
they do, but the quiet resistor is motivated to discount or dismiss that reason and act instead on 
other reasons that favor doing the forbidden thing. The secret lovers, for instance, continue to 
have their relationship not for the reason that it is forbidden but because they love each other and 
want to continue being together. Instead of adding to its appeal, the fact that it is forbidden for 
them to be together actually pressures them to give up on their relationship. On the other hand, it 
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may be the case that for some of the biker women, part of the fun of motorcycle riding is that 
motorcycle riding is forbidden for them. For them, part of the appeal of it is that it is a rebellious 
thing to do. It might even be less fun if it were socially accepted.  
 We can imagine four bikers with four different motivational profiles. The first has no 
knowledge of the stigma against women riding motorcycles and rides her motorcycle simply 
because she enjoys it. The second is aware of the stigma and how it affects her, but she doesn’t 
dwell on it and rides because she enjoys it anyway. The third biker is aware of the stigma and, 
like the first two bikers, says she rides for the thrill of it, but part of what she likes about riding, 
and what makes it so thrilling, is the fact that it is risky and forbidden. She rides in part because 
it is risky and forbidden. Finally, the fourth biker is aware of the stigma against motorcycle 
riding, but it isn’t motorcycle riding that she enjoys. Rather, what she enjoys is rebelling and she 
rides a motorcycle as a means of rebellion. To illustrate:  
• Biker 1: Doesn’t know motorcycle riding is forbidden and rides because she loves it.  
• Biker 2: Knows motorcycle riding is forbidden, but rides because she loves it  
• Biker 3: Knows motorcycle riding is forbidden, but rides both because she loves it 
and because it is forbidden 
• Biker 4: Knows motorcycle riding is forbidden, but rides solely because it is 
forbidden   
Formulated in terms of their reasons for riding:  
• Biker 1: Takes the pleasure of riding to be a reason to ride, and knows of no other 
relevant reasons for or against riding. 
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• Biker 2: Takes the pleasure of riding to be a reason for her to ride - one that 
outweighs the forbidden status of what she does, which she takes to be a reason not to 
ride. 
• Biker 3: Takes both the forbidden-ness and the pleasure of riding to be reasons for 
her to ride. 
• Biker 4: Takes only the forbidden-ness to be a reason to ride - getting pleasure from 
riding isn't a strong reason for her to ride, since she doesn't find it particularly 
pleasurable. She rides to rebel.   
In my view, Biker 1 is not engaged in quiet resistance because the stigma against motorcycle 
riding is in no way connected to her motivation for riding. Consider a version of Biker 1: the 
case of the Western woman who travels to Egypt and rides her motorcycle, with no knowledge 
or awareness of any stigma against women riding motorcycles. Like the Egyptian bikers, the 
Western biker may experience sexual harassment while riding through the city. But while the 
Egyptian bikers know that the harassment is a result of their violating social norms (they know 
they are being socially “bad”), the Western biker has no grasp of her act as a violation of social 
forces because she is ignorant of the social forces affecting women in the region. Since she is 
ignorant, the social sanctions against motorcycle riding for women in no way shape or inform her 
reasons for riding. While she, like the Egyptian bikers, takes the pleasure of motorcycle riding as 
a reason to ride, unlike the Egyptian bikers, she knows of no other relevant reasons for or against 
riding. Her motivation for riding is unrelated to the forbidden status of riding—she neither rides 
because of nor in spite of the social pressures. So, the Western biker is not resisting oppression 
because although, like the Egyptian bikers, she acts contrary to gender-oppressive stereotypes, 
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she neither acts because of nor in spite of the stigma against riding—she is unaware of this 
stigma and thus she accepts no oppression-related risks in acting as she does. 
Bikers 2, 3, and 4, however, are engaged in quiet resistance because they are aware that their 
behavior is socially stigmatized, and their motivation for riding is informed by this awareness. In 
the third and fourth cases, the badness of motorcycle riding is part of why the biker goes on 
riding motorcycles; they ride because of the forbidden status of motorcycle riding. In the second 
case, the badness is not why she rides, but she flouts the badness and rides in spite of it.  
To sum up the descriptive account of the nature of quiet resistance: quiet resistance is a form 
of resistance to oppression that consists in private action against the particular effects of 
oppression on an individual’s life. Quiet resistors riskily pursue a personal project, relationship, 
commitment or ideal that is banned or discouraged by the oppression they experience. They act 
“quietly”, that is, without attempting to send messages of resistance to a public audience. 
Moreover, quiet resistors are aware of the risks they take in acting, and they are motivated to 
discount or dismiss those risks.  Against oppressive social forces pushing them to give up on 
what they value, quiet resistors say “to heck with it! I’m going to do this anyway!”.  
Does Quiet Resistance Always Expose One to Harm?  
Earlier, I argued that quiet resistors accept risks in acting against oppression, but why 
does it matter that they accept risks and what does accepting a risk amount to, for quiet resistors? 
More precisely, does engaging in an act of quiet resistance always expose one to harm? And if 
so, why?  
Quiet resistors risk being harmed for the same reasons that any resistor of oppression 
does. That one could be harmed as a result of one’s behavior is part and parcel of engaging in an 
act of resistance to oppression, be it activism, quiet resistance, or a different kind.  This is 
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because of the nature of the oppression that pervades our societies today. Recall from Chapter 
One that the kind of oppression that pervades our Liberal democratic societies is structural and 
ideological.60 Under oppression, ordinary social mores (everyday habits, customs, practices, 
forms of interaction as well as the cultural scripts, heuristics, tools, ideals, and values that 
influence our behavior) establish unjust relations of power and domination between groups of 
people, often through some form of compulsion, masking, or illusion.61 The social mores and 
structures that are contaminated by the oppressive ideology are always backed by social 
sanctions. Social sanctions are forms of reward or censure that provide compelling incentives for 
people to conform to and reproduce oppression. These sanctions are unknowingly and even 
willingly enacted and distributed by ordinary well-meaning people. Simply by participating in 
their own society’s mores, the subordinated and the privileged alike act as ideology police, 
dealing out censures and punishments to those who deviate or refuse to conform and honors and 
rewards to those who comply, identify with, or reproduce the oppression.  
By doing something banned or discouraged by their oppression, quiet resistors make 
themselves vulnerable to the sanctions that reinforce the social more(s) that their behavior 
contests. More precisely, quiet resistors accept not just any risk, but risks that are oppression-
related. Accepting oppression-related risks in doing something banned or forbidden by 
oppression is an indication of resistance to oppression.  
                                                      
60 The term “ideological oppression” is used this way in Haslanger and Chambers, 2017. An 
ideology is a complex of ideas--social scripts, meanings, ideals, schemas, heuristics, principles 
and the like, which we can draw on in action and which can shape and give meaning to our daily 
lives, interactions, and practices.  
 
61 Guess 1981, Shelby 2003, Celikates 2006, Haslanger 2016, 2017.  
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What are “oppression-related risks?” An oppression-related risk is the risk of suffering 
social sanctions protecting oppressive social mores. Recall the female bikers of Cairo. The bikers 
are engaged in an act of quiet resistance to gender-oppression. More specifically, they are 
snubbing stereotypes that support strict gender roles and discourage women from participating in 
traditionally masculine activities. There are many reasons why their motorcycle riding is risky. 
Some of the risks they take are risks that anyone who rides a motorcycle anywhere must accept: 
they could get into an accident, their bikes might break down, they could get sick from inhaling 
the fumes from their bikes and the city traffic. These risks are the result of no moral wrong or 
injustice, and do not reinforce their gender-oppression. They are not oppression-related because 
although they do impose constraints on how they ride (limiting how fast they can go, forcing 
them to wear protective gear, etc.), they do not target them as women. Moreover, the constraints 
are not a part of a structure that tends to confine, reduce and immobilize them; they actually 
serve to ensure their safety. Recall, oppression is a system of social forces and barriers that work 
to reduce, constrain, and immobilize an entire social group. As Frye writes,  
one is marked for application of oppressive pressures by one’s membership in some 
group or category. Much of one’s suffering and frustration befalls one partly or largely 
because one is a member of that category.62  
 
It is not because they are women that the Egyptian bikers might get into an accident, that 
their bikes might break down, or that they could get sick from the polluted air. If they do suffer 
these sorts of harms, it would not be because of any oppression, but because of the general 
dangers of motorcycle riding.  Among the risks the Egyptian bikers take, however, are risks they 
are vulnerable to because of their gender and because of the supporting social mores that 
establish women’s subordination in society. It is because they are women (and because according 
                                                      
62 Frye, Oppression, The Politics of Reality, p. 16. 
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to society, riding motorcycles is dishonorable for women), that they are vulnerable to being 
harmed in various ways for riding motorcycles. These harms are oppression-related both because 
they befall them because they are women, and because they reinforce the gender-stereotypes the 
bikers snub by riding their motorcycles.   
One may resist oppression, and so face oppression-related risks, whether or not one is a 
member of an oppressed group. Consider the case of the privileged white male employee who 
stands up for a female co-worker against unwanted sexual advances from their boss. The male 
employee knowingly takes an obvious risk—he could have his masculinity insulted, seen as 
someone who “can’t take a joke”, he could be accused of being romantically involved with the 
female coworker (because, why else would he stand up for her?), and he could be fired as a 
result. “Real men” would laugh it off, let it go, or even join in on the fun. The harms the male 
employee exposes himself to are gender-oppression related because they are a consequence of 
his pushing back against an oppressive situation. And, the harms he makes himself vulnerable to 
by pushing back reinforce the domination of men over women in society. His resistance is 
indicated in part by his becoming vulnerable to oppression-related harms as a result of his 
protesting his boss’ misogyny.   
I argued that quiet resistors risk being harmed for the same reason that any resistor of 
oppression risks being harmed: namely, because in systems of ideological oppression, social 
mores that establish unjust relationships of power and domination are backed up by systems of 
reward and censure (“social sanctions”) that provide incentives for conformance. Contesting an 
oppressive social more by acting in a way that is discouraged or forbidden by it always makes 
one vulnerable to being harmed by those social sanctions.  I have been arguing that resistors do 
not risk suffering just any kind of harm, but harms that are oppression-related. Oppression-
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related harms are social sanctions that the resistors make themselves vulnerable to by contesting 
a social more.  
An upshot of my “risk-condition”—the principle that making oneself vulnerable to 
oppression-related harm is an indication that one is resisting oppression—is that it provides a 
basis for distinguishing (1) acts of resistance to oppression and other responses to oppression and 
(2) acts of resistance to oppression and resistance to a different kind of social authority. If a 
person risks suffering no oppression-related harm, in other words, it is doubtful that they are 
resisting as opposed to responding in some other way to oppressive conditions (for instance, 
expressing allegiance with the oppressed, helping or intervening). And, if one makes oneself 
vulnerable to harms when acting, but none of those harms are oppression-related, then it is 
doubtful that it is oppression that they are resisting as opposed to some other kind of authority.  
Consider the following case where someone appears to be doing something like resisting 
gender-oppression, but where, upon further inspection, it turns out they are not really resisting. In 
2016, former president Barak Obama gave a speech at the United States of Women Summit in 
Washington, D.C. where he proclaimed,  
We need to keep changing the attitude that raises our girls to be demure, and our boys 
to be assertive; that criticizes our daughters for speaking out, and our sons for shedding 
a tear.  
We need to change the attitude that punishes women for their sexuality but gives men a 
pat on the back for theirs. We need to change an Internet where women are routinely 
harassed and threatened when they go online.  
We need to keep changing the attitude that congratulates men for changing a diaper, 
stigmatizes full-time dads, penalizes working moms. 
We need to keep changing the attitude that prioritizes being confident, competitive, and 
ambitious in the workplace -- unless you’re a woman.   
We need to keep changing a culture that shines a particularly unforgiving light on 
women and girls of color. About how they look, about how they feel, about what they 
should or should not do. 
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Obama delivered an excellent speech and his message should be widely shared and honored. But, 
was he resisting oppression? I stated earlier that making oneself vulnerable to oppression-related 
harms is some indication of resistance to oppression. But, given his highly privileged status and 
the context in which this speech was given (a summit focused on gender equality, attended by 
those who are working to enhance the status of women) Obama was taking no oppression-related 
risks in giving this speech. It is not obvious that by giving the speech he was thereby exposing 
himself to social sanctions keeping gender inequality in place. It was perfectly appropriate for 
him to convey this message at this social event. At least to this particular audience, the message 
was uncontroversial. Indeed, he was widely praised and respected for it. Instead of resisting, 
Obama was expressing his loyalties with women’s liberation in a way that communicates 
solidarity with women, but poses no gender-oppression-related risk to his autonomy or well-
being. Thus, although Obama was clearly responding to the oppression of women, he was not 
engaged in an act of resistance to it.     
Consider the case of an individual who smokes marijuana in a state where it is not 
accepted in the mainstream culture and illegal to do so. Are they quietly resisting oppression? On 
my view, it could only be an act of resistance if pot-smoking is forbidden or discouraged by the 
oppression that the individual experiences. The fact that it is illegal does not suffice to show that 
it is banned by oppression, since many things are illegal but not oppressive. Doing something 
illegal, even according to unjust laws, does not make a person a resistor of oppression. Neither 
does the fact that it is not socially accepted immediately make it the case that it is oppressive. We 
have to consider why and for whom such behavior is socially unacceptable, who benefits by 
these rules, and whether those rules are part of an oppressive ideology. Is it because of classist or 
sexist tropes that this individual faces pressures not to smoke? An indication of whether this 
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individual’s behavior is one of resistance to oppression is whether they accept oppression-related 
risks by smoking. Does this individual’s smoking make them vulnerable to social sanctions 
keeping unjust power relations in place? Does the risk of suffering those sanctions befall them 
because of their membership in a dominant or subordinated group on an ideological hierarchy? 
Are the social pressures discouraging this person from smoking pot unjust obstacles in the way 
of their fulfilling their values or living a good life? Perhaps it would not be an act of resistance to 
oppression for a rich white male in America to smoke pot illegally, since there are no social 
sanctions censuring rich white men who smoke. But, it may be an act of quiet resistance to 
oppression for individuals who must accept class or gender-oppression related risks for doing so 
and who smoke anyway either because of or in spite of those risks.  
 Whether an act is one of resistance will bear relevantly on how we evaluate it. If courage 
involves doing what is right even when it is costly, then resistance is, all things considered, at 
least somewhat courageous (unlike expressions of allegiance like Obama’s). This is because 
resistance involves doing what is right (in quiet resistance—what one cares about but is banned 
or discouraged by oppression) despite or because of oppression-related risks. Expressing 
allegiance from a position of privilege and authority need not be a courageous act. But, because 
of the risks involved, resistance almost always is.    
In sum, why do quiet resistors take risks when resisting oppression and what does taking 
a risk entail? Quiet resistors always expose themselves to harm because on my view of 
oppression, the effects of oppression (which are essentially the “objects” of resistance) are 
backed up by social sanctions. Social sanctions are systems of praise and censure that serve to 
maintain conformance to the oppressive ideology by maintaining conformance with 
ideologically-contaminated cultural mores. Resistance consists in fighting back, which in quiet 
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resistance is exemplified by doing something one cares about but is banned or discouraged by 
ideologically-contaminated social mores. Whenever one fights back against an effect of 
oppression, one exposes oneself to the social sanctions that keep that effect in place (that 
normalize it, make it seem natural, good etc.). Hence, wherever there is resistance to oppression 
there is also oppression-related risk. What does taking a risk entail? It entails making oneself 
vulnerable to a harm that serves to reinforce conformance to the social more that one’s resistance 
contests. And, it entails being vulnerable to that harm by virtue of being a member of a group 




CHAPTER THREE: WHAT GOOD IS QUIET RESISTANCE? 
 
The previous chapter introduced the idea of quiet resistance, an underrated form of resistance 
where individuals push back against the effects of oppression on their day-to-day lives. Recall, 
quiet resistors resist by pursuing personal projects, preferences, relationships, or ideals that are 
forbidden or discouraged by the oppression they experience. Aware of social sanctions against 
their behavior, they do what they care about in spite of or because of the risks. They have an 
attitude that says “to heck with it, I’m going to do this anyway!”.  
Quiet resistors are not interested in making a statement of protest to the public. Neither are 
they attempting to reduce or eliminate oppression from society. What good, then, is quiet 
resistance? Why are those who engage in it admirable? The aim of this chapter is to provide 
answers to these questions by explaining why the examples of quiet resistance from the previous 
chapter are admirable. The value of quiet resistance, I argue, lies largely in the attitudes it 
exemplifies as well as in its ability to be a source of meaning in life under oppressive conditions. 
Along the way, I will show that prominent theories of resistance to oppression—both harm-based 
and respect-based—are too focused on the paradigm of political protest. As a result, they either 
end up denying the value of quiet resistance, or leave it out of their accounts. It is this gap in the 
literature that this dissertation aims to fill.   
What is the Value of Resistance in General?  
A good place to start thinking about the value of quiet resistance is to consider the value of 
resistance to oppression in general. In the following two sections, I consider two prominent 
approaches to the value of resistance. The first is what I am calling a “harm-based” view, 
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because it makes the reduction of oppressive harm central to the value of resistance. The second 
prominent approach is “respect-based”, because it focuses on the way in which protesting 
oppression is required for properly expressing respect for persons, including respect for oneself. I 
will argue that the harm based view is committed to denying the value of quiet resistance. 
However, the respect based view has the materials to explain it, but needs to be expanded to 
include quiet resistance more explicitly. 
A Harm-Based Theory of Resistance 
In her prominent work, Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd provides a natural answer to the 
question of the value of resistance. For Cudd, the value of resistance turns on its potential to 
reduce oppressive harms or effectively communicate outrage over them. In fact, she thinks only 
such acts can count as resistance to oppression,  
a person or group resists only when they act in a way that could result in lessening 
oppression or sending a message of revolt or outrage… my account does not categorize 
as resistance cases where the only ones witnessing the action are incapable of receiving a 
message of revolt and there is no lessening of oppression. 63 
 
It is crucial for harm focused accounts like Cudd’s to have a clear conception of what 
constitutes an oppressive harm. Cudd divides the harms of oppression into two basic kinds: first 
are material harms, which include “physical violence and economic domination”.64  Second are 
psychological harms, which include psychological abuse involving “words or actions [or images] 
                                                      
63 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 193. 
64 Cudd’s examples of material harm include hate crimes, lynching, torture and police brutality, 
ethnic cleansing, enslavement, segregation, and employment discrimination. Cudd, Analyzing 
Oppression, p. 26 
 
 53 
that denigrate, humiliate, disrespect, or terrorize”.65 The harms of oppression are, in other words, 
setbacks to welfare interests that certain people suffer because of their social group identity. 
Welfare interests are the very basic interests that all people have simply in virtue of their being 
human persons. Under oppression, they are systemically denied to certain people because of their 
social group belonging (i.e. because they are black, trans, women, disabled, etc.). 66  
On Cudd’s harm-based account, then, for an act to be considered a morally valuable act 
of resistance to oppression, the act must constitute an attempt to express outrage over or relieve 
some setback to oppressed persons’ welfare interests that is caused by oppression.  Cudd insists, 
however, that “resisting oppression is prima facie morally praiseworthy”, and we can only be 
commended for acts that we perform intentionally.67 Acts that end up reducing harm 
unintentionally are not, on her view, morally valuable acts of resistance. So, she adds two 
necessary conditions on morally significant acts of resistance to oppression. The first is a 
stringent intentionality condition, which states that for an act to be considered an act of resistance 
at all, “there has to be an intention to lessen the oppression, and… the intention to lessen the 
oppression must be part of the cause of the action.”68 Intending to lessen oppression consists in 
                                                      
65 Cudd’s examples of psychological harm include stereotypes, sexual objectification, the trauma 
resulting from material harms, “racial epithets, gender slurs, and humiliating or degrading 
descriptions or images of one’s social group”, Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 156.  
 
66 As Joel Feinberg understands them, welfare interests include “…physical health and vigor, the 
integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or 
grotesque disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the absence of 
groundless anxieties and resentments…at least minimal income and financial security, a tolerable 
social and physical environment…” (Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 37). 
 
67 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, p. 187.  
 
68 Cudd, “Strikes, Housework, and the Moral Obligation to Resist” p. 26. 
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intending to reduce or protest its harms.69 For the act to be considered a praiseworthy act of 
resistance, it must in addition be likely either to reduce oppressive harms or to communicate 
resistance effectively. Hence, the second condition is what I’m calling an efficacy condition, 
which states that all morally valuable resistance should be likely to be effective in reducing 
material and psychological harms or in communicating revolt or outrage over them. Pushing 
back against oppression for any reason other than reducing its harms or communicating outrage 
is not, on Cudd’s view, a morally valuable act of resistance.70   
Cudd’s harm-based view implies that quiet resistance, resistance that is neither intended 
to relieve harms nor to communicate outrage over oppression to an audience, is not a morally 
valuable act of resistance. I agree with Cudd that reducing harm and expressing outrage to the 
oppressors are valuable aims of resistance. We simply cannot do without them if we want to 
eliminate oppression from our societies. But I disagree with her that the only valuable forms of 
resistance are those that fulfill these necessary conditions. Indeed, quiet resistance need not 




                                                      
69 For Cudd “the question of whether oppression is lessened turns on whether the harm has been 
reduced, lessened, or mitigated”. Intending to resist, for her, consists in having a belief in the 
badness of the oppressive situation plus a pro attitude (i.e. a wish, hope, or desire) that it end or 
be mitigated, plus a belief that the relevant action will achieve the desired end. The belief might 
be “that my people are oppressed” or “that oppression is unjust”. The pro- attitude might be “a 
wish that oppression end, or a desire that the oppressor be killed”. See Cudd, Analyzing 
Oppression, p. 193. And Silvermint, “Resisting for Other Reasons”, p. 9-10.   
 
70 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression p. 187. 
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Harm-Independent Reasons to Resist Oppression  
Recall that Cudd’s view is that acts of resistance are only morally valuable insofar as they 
attempt to reduce the aggregate harms of oppression or express revolt or outrage over them. 
Hence, if someone is powerless to do anything that could constitute such an attempt, they are 
under no moral imperative to resist their oppression. But, a person may still have some 
significant degree of moral agency in how they respond to their experiences of oppression, even 
under the most extreme conditions where there is really nothing they can do to reduce harm and 
where expressing outrage will surely get them seriously hurt or even killed.  
In Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, Offred is enslaved as a Handmaid under the 
theocratic patriarchy of the Republic of Gilead. The role of the Handmaids is to be breeders for 
the Commanders whose wives are infertile Over the course of her life under the regime, Offred 
puts up a fight against internalizing the severely oppressive ideology being forced upon her. The 
Handmaids are told, for instance, that being impregnated by the Commanders is a great honor 
and that they are “special flowers” for having this role. Some of the other Handmaids have 
learned that their lives are less painful when they disengage from the world psychologically and 
just “go with the flow”. They learn to become indifferent to what is happening around them. 
Others have come to endorse the ideology, taking pride in their role as breeders. Instead, Offred 
repeatedly and actively focuses her attention on thoughts and memories of her life before being 
captured, always condemning what is happening around her. She finds an illicit carving in her 
closet, “don’t let the bastards grind you down”. She becomes captivated by the message, reflects 
on its meaning and repeats it to herself like a mantra. She is able to maintain her values and self- 
respect, but as a result, her life is full of pain and turmoil, and her masters become increasingly 
abusive and suspicious of her.   
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Offred’s quiet resistance is largely internal. After all, she cannot afford to outwardly 
express outrage at her conditions, she would surely be killed if she did. Internal resistance aims 
to push against the particular ways oppression takes a toll on one’s mind, character and 
capacities, for instance, by refusing to let the oppressors “get you down”, building up mental 
walls, taking a rebellious attitude to oppressive situations, or generally refusing to be entirely 
controlled by them.71 Offred also performs subtle acts of external resistance, for instance, when 
she makes eye contact with the guardian who is not permitted to look at her, when she steals 
butter to use as moisturizer, and secretly meets the Commander just to play Scrabble and read 
(all of which are activities that the Handmaids are forbidden from doing). As a result, she suffers 
far more than she would if she were to accept the ideology being forced upon her, as some of the 
other handmaids have done.  
By doing what she can to push back against what is happening to her, even if only 
secretly through small acts that others would not be able to recognize as acts of resistance at all, 
Offred exercises admirable traits. In particular, she exhibits courage in standing firm in her 
values against danger and self- respect in refusing to submit to the regime. Oppression constrains 
what individuals can voluntarily do to lessen their oppression. It conceals relevant information, 
instills an inferiorized self- image, and imposes physical and social penalties on behavior that 
strays from or weakens oppressive institutions. The most deeply entrenched and pervasive harms 
are beyond the power of individuals to defeat, and would require the collective efforts of an 
entire society to change, and as Cudd rightly mentions, we often cannot trust that others will join 
us in resisting.   
                                                      
71 See Hay, “The Obligation to Resist Oppression”, p. 31. 
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The Handmaid’s Tale shows that it simply doesn’t follow from the fact that one can’t 
lessen the harms of oppression or express outrage over them that one can’t resist oppression’s 
harms in any morally admirable way.  If someone is unable to lessen their oppression or express 
outrage over it, what we should conclude is that they can’t be morally expected to do those 
things, not that they don’t have reason to do anything to resist their oppression at all.  
We should keep straight the subtle conceptual difference between resisting a harm and 
reducing it. This difference tends to get blurred on the harm-based picture because, as we saw 
earlier, it upholds the reduction of harm as the only source of the obligation to resist. And, it only 
counts acts that potentially reduce harm or communicate outrage over harm as fulfilling the 
obligation. The moral value of resisting a harm without attempting to protest or reduce it is goes 
unrecognized.  
Resisting oppression means voluntarily pushing back by exerting some disobedient 
counter force. But the disobedience could mean condemning the force in one’s mind, building up 
protective barriers against it, or managing to preserve or achieve forbidden goods in spite of its 
countervailing pressure. Reducing oppression, on the other hand, means aiming to actually lessen 
or eliminate the harm, usually using external behaviors, for instance by attacking the force 
directly (e.g. directly yelling at a catcaller), boycotting it (if it’s a corrupt organization), or 
raising consciousness by loudly protesting it. Attempting to reduce a harm always involves 
attempting to resist it. But attempting to resist a harm does not always involve attempting to 
reduce it.   
Examples of Quiet Resistance show that reducing harm and resisting harm come apart in 
significant, yet subtle and related ways. And, there may be reasons to resist oppression 
independently of contributing to its reduction. But the differences between resisting oppression 
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morally and reducing oppressive harms cannot be captured if we assume, as the harm- reductive 
account does, that morally good resistance just is that which is aimed at the lessening of 
oppressive harms.  Cudd’s account is unable to accept that quiet resistance is valuable. So, we 
have to look elsewhere.       
Respect and the Value of Resistance 
Recall that I mentioned that Offred’s quiet resistance contains an element of self- respect. It 
might be helpful then, to look at accounts of the value of resistance that stress the importance of 
respect. Maybe here we can find stepping stones to the value of quiet resistance. Pioneering a 
respect-based approach to the value of resistance, Bernard Boxill and Thomas Hill stress that 
unfortunately, acts of resistance to oppression are often unlikely to result in a minimization of 
harm or in convincing the oppressors that one has rights. Sometimes, Hill writes, 
there seems to be no reasonable hope of achieving these ends. The perpetrators of 
injustice will not be moved, protest may be inconvenient or risky to oneself, and its long- 
range effects on others may be minimal or may include as much harm as help.72  
 
Despite the risks, resistance under such conditions can nevertheless be morally admirable. But 
what could its value consist in?   
Boxill argues that protesting oppressions’ violations of one’s rights demonstrates “a 
righteous and self- respecting concern” for oneself. Outwardly declaring that you have rights, 
and that you care about defending them may not be effective in changing other people’s 
perceptions of you, but it is vital for maintaining faith in your own value. Acquiescing to 
oppression is wrong because it is inconsistent with self-respect.  
The powerless but self- respecting person will declare his self- respect [and will be driven 
to make his claim unmistakable]. He will protest. His protest affirms that he has rights. 
More important, it tells everyone that he believes he has rights and that he therefore 
                                                      
72 Hill, “Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence”, p. 83.  
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claims self- respect. When he has to endure wrongs he cannot repel and feels his self- 
respect threatened, he will publicly claim it in order to reassure himself that he has it.73  
 
Hill agrees with Boxill that respect has an important role to play in explaining the value of 
protest when protest is unlikely to bring about beneficial consequences. But, he does not agree 
that the value of protest lies only in assuring oneself that one has value. This, Hill thinks, focuses 
too much on what protest is supposed to do for the protestor. Hill suggests an alternative 
conception of the value of resistance, inspired by Kant. He writes,  
any decent self- respecting person has more to offer individuals (and groups, causes, and 
so on) than whatever effective action he can take on their behalf. He can also give [them] 
‘honor’, credit, and acclaim; and he does this not just by explicit praise but by identifying 
himself publicly with those individuals (groups, causes, and so on).74  
 
Indeed, whether we like to admit it or not, we all care about what other people think of 
us, as Hill puts it, we care about the “honor they do us by identifying with us”, and not only 
about what they can do to benefit us. Protesting anyway, despite the risks and bad consequences, 
is valuable, not because it gives vent to their outrage at injustices they cannot prevent, but 
because protesting enables them to honor those who deserve to be honored and to meaningfully 
identify oneself with the good and against evil.       
Boxill and Hill provide helpful resources for thinking about the value of quiet resistance. 
However, they are focused on paradigms of resistance that clash with the acts of quiet resistance 
that I’ve described. Both Hill and Boxill focus on acts of protest where the agents are motivated 
by their intolerance of an injustice and where they take action in order to assert and reclaim their 
rights or symbolically communicate that one stands in solidarity with the oppressed. Hill, for 
instance, is explicit in his use of paradigms like the non- Jewish woman in Nazi Germany who 
                                                      
73 Boxill, “Self- Respect and Protest”, p. 69. 
 
74 Hill, “Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence”, p. 98.  
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considers protesting discriminatory laws against Jews; and the liberal business man who 
considers walking out of the dinner party in protest of his associates openly racist conversation. 
75 Boxill has in mind the anti- slavery activism and orations of abolitionist leader Frederick 
Douglass.   
Unlike the people in the above examples, quiet resistors like the Egyptian bikers are not 
engaged in acts of protest, and they don’t ride out of a “righteous concern” for their rights. 
They’re not out there trying to convince anyone of anything. They ride because they love it. 
Moreover, the significance of their motorcycle riding is not merely symbolic. They are not 
simply expressing an allegiance with a valuable project against norms forbidding it, they are 
actively doing it. There are decisive differences between acts of protest and quiet resistance, 
especially from the first-person point of view.  
Unlike Cudd, who is committed to denying the value of quiet resistance, Hill and Boxill open 
up the possibility that quiet resistance is a real form of resistance, one that can be valuable for its 
role in enabling a person to have and express respect for themselves as well as others. But, like 
Cudd, they are focused on acts of protest, and they end up leaving quiet resistance out of their 
accounts. Inspired by Hill and Boxill, the account I provide emphasizes the non-consequentialist 
value of quiet resistance. In the following section, I will argue that quiet resistance is valuable 
not only for its potential to inspire social and political progress, but also because the individual 
who says “to heck with it!” and quietly resists exhibits admirable attitudes--namely, courage and 
self-respect.   
 
 
                                                      
75 Hill, “Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence”, p. 84.  
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What is the Value of Quiet Resistance?  
What moral or prudential reasons do individuals have to engage in quiet resistance and 
why should we admire those who do? One reason to think that quiet resistance is valuable is that 
it can inspire cultural changes that are difficult to achieve through political action. The more 
people defy oppressive situations pressuring them not to do certain things that anyone should be 
free to do, the more likely we are to destabilize oppression and eventually eliminate its authority 
(e.g. the more women in Egypt ride motorcycles, the sooner it will become socially accepted for 
women to ride motorcycles and they will be free to enjoy it if they choose). Another, related, 
reason to think that quiet resistance is valuable is that it can eventually inspire individuals to take 
political action against oppression. People who are committed to quietly resisting the effects of 
oppression on their personal lives are likely to support social justice reform and engage in 
activism against oppression in politics and culture.  
The above lines of thought take the value of quiet resistance to be in its good 
consequences; namely, its potential to rouse political action and reduce oppression in politics and 
culture. Its strikes me, however, that there is more to the value of quiet resistance than this. The 
examples of quiet resistance from the previous chapter show that individuals have reason to 
engage in it quite independently of its possible social/political benefits. After all, many quiet 
resistors don’t care that their behavior has a positive impact. Recall Houdey, the vogue dancer, 
who said, “I’m too busy building my life and my career to think about politics”, and the Egyptian 
bikers who say they ride their motorcycles simply because they love it. I do not deny that quiet 
resistance can make a positive impact on society. However, the common good does not figure 
strongly, if at all, in quiet resistors motivations. Our explanation of why quiet resistance can be 
admirable should capture the testimonies and experiences of those who engage in it admirably. 
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This means that our account should explain why it can be admirable independently of its 
potential to contribute to the common good.   
The positive social/political impact of quiet resistance aside, why is quiet resistance 
admirable? Quiet resistance is not admirable unconditionally or in all cases. Sometimes 
oppressive norms forbid projects that generally everyone should avoid doing because they are 
wrong. Tiger- hunting, for example, is a stereotypically masculine sport and women must defy 
gender norms in order to do it. But given the animal cruelty involved, it would be morally wrong 
to say “to heck with it!” and start ruthlessly hunting tigers simply because you enjoyed it. Other 
times, the forbidden pursuit is one that anyone should be permitted to do, but because of the 
circumstances pursuing it would be reckless or cause disproportionate harms to oneself or others. 
For instance, if pursuing your art against oppression requires you to abandon or betray your 
family or is bound to result in your being so harmed that you lose your ability to deliberate 
rationally, then you have strong moral reason not to engage in quiet resistance. Indeed, 
sometimes it is admirable to forego doing something one wants and is permitted to do in order to 
help others, or make one’s own life go better.  
It is important to flag some important assumptions that I am making about the examples 
of quiet resistance from the previous chapter. The quiet resistors in my examples pursue what 
they care about with the knowledge that society forbids or discourages it. And although defying 
social pressures makes them vulnerable to oppression-related harms, doing what they want to do 
is not utterly reckless. As I describe the cases of quiet resistance, there is nothing immoral or 
reckless happening. S and L, the Egyptian bikers, Houdey, and Nayla are not being utterly 
reckless, even if their behaviors does upset others and expose them to harm. No one should 
blame them for wanting to have and fulfill their aspirations. In the case of the secret lovers, we 
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might even say that the quiet resistance is not merely permissible, but the morally right thing to 
do—something that the lovers owe to each other out of mutual love.  
I take it, however, that the secret lovers are not merely giving each other what they owe. 
Moreover, the Egyptian bikers, the Vogue Dancer, and Nayla are not merely doing something 
they are morally permitted to do by riding, dancing, and wearing nailpolish. And, although 
presumably their behavior satisfies their desires, they are not merely doing something that gives 
them pleasure. Indeed, that is not why we admire them. What makes quiet resistance admirable is 
not that it is a form of duty-fulfillment or desire satisfaction. What, then, does its value consist 
in?   
Courage and Self-Respect 
Under different circumstances, there would be nothing morally admirable about riding a 
motorcycle, vogue dancing, wearing nail polish, or having a relationship. But the nature of such 
acts changes under circumstances where they are unjustly banned or stigmatized and where 
pursuing them anyway exposes one to harm. When what one wants, and has a right, to do is 
forbidden by oppressive forces, doing it anyway in spite of or because of the risks involved 
becomes an act of resistance to oppression. And, acts of resistance to oppression are prima facie 
admirable.   
In the previous chapter, I described the quiet resistor as having an attitude that says, “to 
heck with it! I’m going to do this anyway”.  The quiet resistors in my examples are admirable 
largely because in their circumstances, having this kind of attitude is admirable. Stated more 
precisely, their attitude is one that says, “I will not be stopped from doing what I am permitted to 
do when I want to do it”.  This attitude exemplifies self-respect.    
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What does self-respect involve? The self-respecting person is often described as someone 
who properly values and understands her own worth. But, what sort of worth could the quiet 
resistors be appreciating when they ride their motorcycles, vogue dance, wear nail polish, and 
continue their relationship? Thomas Hill argues that the self-respecting person is not someone 
who simply understands and values her worth to others, because one can be useful and loved by 
others and still lack a sense of their worth Nor is the self-respecting person someone who simply 
has the belief that, despite others’ opinion, she has equal status in a system of moral rights, since 
she can have this belief while feeling as if her personal preferences, projects, commitments, and 
ideals are worthless, even to herself. “At least part of [properly appreciating] one’s own worth” 
Hill writes, “is having, and living by, personal standards or ideals that one sees, whether 
objective or not, as an important part of oneself”.76  
The self-respecting person sees herself as having aspirations that are her own, that she 
counts as worth her time, and that others must treat respectfully as what she has a right to pursue. 
Moreover, to apply a lesson from Boxill, the self-respecting person is moved to do something 
about it when her aspirations are threatened, when she is prevented from pursuing them. She will 
take action and do it anyway, even if it has no effect on changing other’s perceptions of her. In a 
society that treats her as an object to be acted upon, the self-respecting person acts upon society, 
refusing to let it make her complacent with regards to her life and aspirations. She is moved to 
create a life of her own, one that she counts as worth her time. And this means that when faced 
with social pressure to give in on what she cares about, she will pursue it anyway, saying “to 
heck with it!” or, more precisely, “I will not be stopped from doing what I am permitted to do 
when I want to do it”.   
                                                      
76 Hill, “Self-Respect Reconsidered”, Autonomy and Self-Respect, p. 136.  
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Following Hill and Boxill, I take it that the quiet resistors in my examples are admirable 
for having and enacting self-respect. Their behavior shows that they have and live by personal 
preferences and pursuits that they see as an important part of themselves, even when other people 
don’t respect them and try to interfere. Moreover, refusing to be stopped from doing what one 
wants to do when oppression forbids it, requires a kind of courage—a willingness to do what one 
has a right to do and would not be reckless (or, depending on the case, what is the right thing to 
do) in the face of danger. Hence, quiet resistors do not only exhibit self-respect in refusing to be 
stopped from doing what they want to do, but also courage in standing up for themselves in the 
face of danger. Thus, quiet resistance is admirable both for its self-respect and courage.     
   It is worth noting that one need not have the admirable attitude “I’m not going to be 
stopped from doing what I want to do…” when resisting oppression. One can join a strike 
begrudgingly, thinking, “I would rather stay home, but guess I guess have to do this or else I 
might look like a jerk to my co-workers.”. Or, one can have deep feelings of shame for one’s 
quiet resistance—imagine a self-loathing gay man thinking “I have sexual feelings for other 
men, but this is a horrible part of myself that I must try to snuff out”. These kinds of attitudes are 
very different from the ones that the people in my examples have. Instead of exhibiting a refusal 
to be stopped from doing what one wants to do, and what one sees as worth their time, instead of 
exhibiting respect for ones’ personal preferences and pursuits, the attitudes of the begrudging 
striker and the self-loathing gay man exhibit something more like self-abnegation, self-denial, 





Finding Meaning in Life Through Quiet Resistance 
Not only do moral demands pose limitations on the value of quiet resistance, but so do 
our individual tastes. There are certain projects that are not really worth our quietly resisting for 
because, though they may be morally permissible, we don’t really care about doing them. They 
may be irrelevant to us, boring or unfulfilling, although we might think they are worthy pursuits 
for others with different tastes. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to make the case that 
under certain conditions quiet resistance is partially constitutive of living a meaningful life under 
oppression.   
A meaningful life is one in which a person is engaged in pursuits that are both 
psychologically gripping and objectively valuable. Susan Wolf puts it well: “meaning arises 
when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness”.77  Applying this to our current topic, 
quiet resistance is partially constitutive of living a meaningful life under oppression, when it is 
subjectively satisfying and objectively valuable.  
A project is subjectively satisfying if you care about it personally and it grips you 
emotionally. I do not mean that it needs to make us feel pleasure or make us particularly happy, 
although it might (I take it, that for the bikers motorcycle riding does). Indeed, many of the 
things we care about, like writing philosophy papers, maintaining long- distance relationships, 
and comforting our friends when they have a bad day, can be rather painful and do not always 
make us particularly happy. If we are subjectively fulfilled by a project, whether it gives us 
pleasure to do it or not, our attention is engaged while we do it. That is, we are not bored, 
indifferent, or merely “going through the motions”. Ideally, we endorse the project. I don’t mean 
                                                      
77 Wolf, “Meaningfulness”, p. 253. 
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we should pursue it without hesitation, since often pursuing forbidden projects comes with costs, 
including the potential of harm to self or others, or the risk of endangering our relationships. 
However, being deeply ashamed of acting against oppression suggests that one is not really 
resisting but perhaps actually buying into oppressive norms.78   
What is it for a pursuit to be objectively valuable? On Wolf’s account, a project is 
objectively valuable when the source of its value lies outside of oneself. That is, the project is 
valuable independently of whether you happen to find it subjectively engaging or not.  It is 
something that “can be appropriately appreciated, admired, or valued by others at least in 
principle”.79  Wolf lists playing Sudoku and smoking pot as among her examples of projects that 
are not objectively valuable. This is because under normal conditions, Sudoku and smoking pot 
wouldn’t be worth doing unless they were entertaining—and as such, are not objectively 
valuable. But, coaching a school soccer team, planning a surprise party, and reviewing an article 
for a journal all engage with worthy objects of love and do so in a way that contributes to 
something whose value lies outside of and is independent of oneself.80  
How should we apply the notion of objective value to activities that are forbidden under 
oppression? Should we conclude that there is no objective value in such activities as wearing nail 
                                                      
78 Going through a phase where one feels ashamed might be a necessary stepping stone to 
eventually coming to endorse the project and feel entitled to pursue it. Wolf, “The Meanings of 
Lives”, A Variety of Values, p. 95. 
 
79 You might still wonder “well, who is to say which projects are valuable?” I think that through 
a process of reflective equilibrium, we can come to an answer for particular cases. Wolf 
responds, “the task of determining which activities and projects are worthwhile is a never- 
ending process, both because, as fallible creatures, our judgements of value will always be 
somewhat tentative, and because at some level the sorts of things that have value are apt to 
change over time”, Wolf, “Meaningfulness”, p. 263- 264.  
 
80 Wolf, “Meaningfulness”, p. 257. 
 68 
polish or riding motorcycles, and therefore, that these acts of quiet resistance are not meaningful? 
Wolf does not consider meaning in life under oppressive conditions. However, her account can 
be filled in to accommodate the value of acts of quiet resistance like the ones I’ve been 
discussing. Activities like wearing nail polish and riding motorcycles that outside of oppression 
are only worth doing because they are subjectively fulfilling, and as such are not, on Wolf’s 
account, objectively valuable, can come to acquire objective value under oppressive 
circumstances where they are socially forbidden. Although the bikers ride for the pleasure of it, 
their riding motorcycles also has objective value because, in their context, riding motorcycles 
constitutes an act of resistance to oppression. It flouts gender-based stereotypes in the face of 
known risk. As such, riding a motorcycle in the bikers’ context exhibits both courage and self- 
respect. Courage because they stand firm in what they love to do against backlash. And self- 
respect because they refuse to submit to the oppressive stereotypes telling them they cannot ride 
motorcycles. So, riding motorcycles because one loves how it feels, in spite of its being 
forbidden, has objective value because it constitutes an act of resistance, and it expresses both 
courage and self- respect. Hence, ordinary activities that have purely subjective value under non- 
oppressive conditions can acquire objective value if doing them constitutes an act of resistance 
and, as such, exercises objectively valuable traits.   
I’ve just argued that quiet resistance can be a source of meaningfulness in a life under 
oppression, however quiet resistance can have value independently of whether it is a source of 
meaning in life.   Although on Wolf’s view objective value is necessary for an act to be a source 
of meaning in life, on my view, acts of quiet resistance can have objective value even if they 
don’t contribute significantly to the overall meaningfulness of a life.  
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Fulfilling a purely hedonistic desire in a context that forbids it—for instance seeking 
sexual pleasure in a world where women who do so are shamed—can still exemplify courage 
and self-respect, and can still constitute an act of resistance, independently of whether it 
contributes to the overall meaningfulness of a person’s life. Quiet resistance needn’t be a 
significant source of meaningfulness in life in order for it to be a good thing to do. Nevertheless, 
Wolf’s theory of meaningfulness provides a rich dimension for thinking about how quiet 
resistance can be, and is often, valuable. Let’s not forget that in many compelling cases, (like the 
secret lovers, but the same can be said of women who pursue beloved careers that are 
traditionally reserved for men), the act of quiet resistance is an important meaning-giving force 
in a person’s life.   
In this chapter, I argued that quiet resistance is a valuable independently of its potential to 
have a positive social/political impact. When it exhibits an attitude that says, “I will not be 
stopped from doing what I want to do” it can exemplify both self-respect and courage. And, 
when it involves pursuing something that is both subjectively fulfilling and objectively valuable, 
it can be a source of meaning in life under oppressive conditions. However, the value of quiet 
resistance is difficult to recognize if we assume that all resistance is admirable for the same 
reasons that political activism is admirable—namely, as theorists have argued, because it 




CHAPTER FOUR: A TAXONOMY OF RESISTANCE 
 
There is a presumption among philosophers and ordinary people that political activism is the 
model and measure of good resistance. The presumption is often reflected in the view that if you 
want to resist oppression well, then you should aspire to do the things that good activists 
typically do—engage in strategic collective action, publically express your outrage over the 
oppression, work to change unjust laws and institutions. In the literature, this presumption lies in 
the kinds of examples that theorists typically reach for when building accounts of resistance; 
often clear cases of political activism. Some accounts explicitly privilege certain characteristics 
of activism, turning them into necessary and sufficient conditions in their attempts to define 
resistance.  Oppression is, however, an extremely complex and multifaceted phenomenon. One 
that has concrete personal and psychological effects on individuals’ day-to-day lives and 
relationships, in addition to having large-scale effects on the political structure.  Since the effects 
of oppression permeate various levels of society—both personal and political—it strikes me that 
there are countless ways to resist oppression, activism is just one of them. And, it strikes me that 
different acts of resistance are valuable for different reasons. Their value will depend in part on 
their specific features. However, these differences will be very difficult to see if we assume that 
all resistance is like—or should aspire to be like—political activism.  
My goal in this chapter is twofold. First, I want to convince readers that although 
activism is undeniably vital to resistance movements, we should avid assuming that all resistance 
is like it, or should aspire to be. Like oppression, resistance is a complex and variable 
phenomenon, and there are forms of resistance that bear little resemblance to political activism. 
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The second and main goal of this chapter is to present a taxonomy of features that differentiate 
acts of resistance and bear relevantly on their value. This chapter will not provide a 
comprehensive theory of resistance and the ways in which it can be valuable. Instead, my aim is 
to supplement existing discussions of resistance by highlighting some differentiating features 
that are easy to overlook when we identify the paradigm of resistance with political activism.  
The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part 1 lays the ground for discussion by briefly 
reviewing the concepts of oppression and resistance, which are discussed in more detail in earlier 
chapters of this dissertation. Part 2 argues that acts of resistance can be differentiated by: (1) 
their agent: who is resisting, a collective or individual? (2) their object: what is being resisted, a 
private circumstance or an aspect of political administration? (3) the goal of the resistance: what 
are the values or interests being expressed or advanced by the act of resistance? And (4) their 
communicative tone: does the resistor aim to communicate loud and clear messages of 
resistance, or do they act without aiming to send messages of resistance to others?  
I argue that there are multiple distinguishing features that can belong to an act of resistance to 
oppression. Resistance can be an individual or collective effort (agent) against a cultural or 
political condition or state of affairs (object). It can attempt to express or advance global or local 
values or interests (goal), and it can consist of a loud attention-soliciting communicative act of 
resistance, or a “quiet” act, not intended to communicate anything to others (communicative 
aspect). In Part 3, I argue that the features of resistance that I outline in Part 2 are not rigid 
categories, permitting of no overlap or grey-area. I draw connections between them and show 
how they can interact in real-world situations.  
Let’s start by briefly reviewing the concepts of oppression and resistance. Oppression refers 
to systems of social forces and barriers that subordinate and immobilize entire groups or 
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categories of people.81 Jean Harvey calls the kind of oppressions that often pervade Liberal 
democratic societies (e.g. sexism and racism) “civilized oppressions” because rather than 
resulting exclusively from the top-down decisions of tyrants or unjust political authorities, they 
are sustained by the ordinary mechanisms of the mainstream culture. Civilized oppressions 
employ mechanisms that cannot be codified by any law or official document. And, although they 
do inflict physical and economic harms and reinforce unjust legislation, a great part of the harm 
inflicted by them is psychological. They work by creating false and degrading images of certain 
social groups and solidifying those images in the social fabric. Through repeated exposure, 
oppression shapes the psychologies of ordinary well-meaning people—their habits, lifestyle, 
modes of interaction, body comportment, beliefs, desires, affections, expectations, etc.—
conditioning them to accept them unquestioningly and to participate in the cultural norms that 
sustain and reproduce oppression.82  
Oppression can be extremely difficult to recognize, even by its victims. This is because 
its effects tend to be perceived as natural or mundane. Those who participate in its mechanisms, 
victims and non-victims alike, usually do not think of themselves as participating in a system of 
oppression at all. To understand why certain practices are oppressive, we must zoom out and 
study them at the macro level, and draw connections between them and other practices within an 
oppressive structure.83   
                                                      
81 Marilyn Frye (1983), Politics of Reality. And Iris Young (1990) Justice and the Politics of 
Difference.  
 
82 Jean Harvey, “Victims, Resistance, and Civilized Oppression”, 14. 
 
83 Marilyn Frye (1983), Politics of Reality.  
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What constitutes an act of resistance to oppression? I argued in chapter two that not all 
resistance is like activism. Indeed, as we saw in that chapter, quiet resistance—a prevalent and 
positively life-shaping form of resistance—diverges significantly from activism. Therefore, it 
would be wrong to disqualify an act from potentially being one of resistance on the basis of its 
lacking activism’s characteristic features. It would be wrong to say that a given act is not one of 
resistance if it, for instance, does not aim to effectively reduce or eliminate the aggregate harms 
of oppression, or it does not make a public expression of resistance, or it does not involve 
collective action towards a political or humanitarian cause. Otherwise, we would have to deny 
that examples like the ones discussed earlier (e.g. refusing to give up your dream job against 
sexist pressures) can be acts of resistance. 
Leading theories of resistance call a few important considerations to our attention when 
determining whether an act constitutes one of resistance to oppression: (1) Is the agent aware of 
the oppressive force and do they take some action against it? (2) does the agent at some level see 
the limitation as wrong or unacceptable? And (3) is the act likely to reduce or symbolically 
oppose the oppressive force?   
 Theories put different amounts of weight on each of these considerations, even making 
some of them necessary conditions. Harm-based theories like Ann Cudd’s, for instance, insist 
that for an act to count as resistance, it must constitute an attempt to reduce or protest the 
aggregate harms of oppression and it must be likely to succeed in doing so.84 Volitional accounts 
                                                      
84 Cudd, “Strikes, Housework, and the Moral Obligation to Resist”, p.28. “A person or group 
resists only when they act in a way that could result in lessening oppression or sending a 
message of revolt or outrage to someone… [this] does not count as cases of resistance cases 
where the only ones witnessing the action are incapable of receiving a message of revolt and 
there is no lessening of oppression.” 
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of resistance like Roger Gottlieb’s focus on the agent’s intentions such that regardless of whether 
she is likely to succeed in reducing oppressive harms or communicating outrage over them, an 
agent can be said to be resisting oppression as long as she has the intention to do so.85 I discussed 
these debates in the literature and others in chapter two and four. Putting them aside now, there 
are a few minimal features that all efforts to resist oppression tend to share and which will be 
helpful to mention here in our review of the notion of resistance.  
First and most obviously, acts of resistance attempt to push back on not just any kind of 
social force, but a social force of a certain kind: one that is oppressive. Oppressive forces include 
unjust legislation and institutional procedures in addition to the everyday informal cultural 
forces, and their internalized effects, that degrade and inhibit certain people in virtue of their 
belonging to a certain social group.86  
 Second, for a person to be resisting oppression, they must also have a basic perception of 
the oppressive force as bad or unacceptable. The perception must inform her motivation for 
acting. An agent cannot be said to be resisting if she has no idea that society discourages or 
forbids her behavior. A woman who resolves never to put on make-up, for example, but is 
completely unaware of the social forces pressuring women to wear it and punishing women who 
don’t, could hardly be said to be resisting oppression by resolving not to put it on. When a person 
resists oppression, she pushes back against an oppressive force that she at some level perceives 
as bad and that she knows would pose some risk for her to defy. She needn’t take the wrongness 
                                                      
85 Both approaches face problems, which I discuss elsewhere. I am just flagging these views 
without endorsing them here.  
 
86 I disagree with Gottlieb that the concept of resistance implies a context of oppression such that 
resistance is always resistance to oppression because I think we can resist practices that are not 
oppressive.  
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of the oppressive force as the reason for challenging it. She might act against it because she 
wants to pursue a personal project or relationship. In a culture that considers same-sex love a sin, 
for example, having a same-sex relationship defies oppressive norms. The fact that those norms 
are oppressive provides one kind of reason to defy them, and to defy them through particular 
kinds of acts, perhaps though protest. But someone might defy those norms by pursuing a same-
sex relationship, not out of protest of those norms, but simply because they are in love with 
someone. Such a person is resisting oppression if they know that same-sex relationships are 
forbidden in their culture and that choosing to have one anyway is risky. But with an attitude that 
says “to heck with that! I’m going to do this anyway!”, they are motivated to discount or dismiss 
those risks and act instead on reasons that favor pursuing their same-sex relationship, oppression 
notwithstanding.  
Resistance to oppression involves, at the very least, pushing back against oppressive 
forces in the face of some known risk. Resistors needn’t have any sophisticated theoretical 
knowledge of oppression, but they do need to know that there are social forces banning or 
discouraging their behavior. The risk involved in violating those forces is a reason for them not 
to do it, but resistors are motivated to discount or dismiss that reason and act instead on other 
reasons that favor doing what oppression bans or discourages. These are the minimal 
requirements for an act of resistance—not, as some have argued, that the agent acts with the 
intention of reducing or protesting oppression or that their action is likely to be effective in 





Having reviewed the basics of oppression and resistance, we can now move on to the main 
task of this chapter. In this section, I will differentiate acts of resistance along four axes: the 
agent of resistance: who is the resistor and in what capacity do they resist? The resisted object: 
what sort of effect of oppression is being resisted? The goal of the resistance: what are the values 
or interests that the act of resistance aims to express or advance against oppression? And the 
communicative aspect of the resistance: does the act aim to communicate resistance to others?   
The Agents of Resistance: Individuals, Collectives, Allies, and Victims  
The first set of differentiating features that I want to discuss concern the nature of the agent 
of resistance; who is the resistor and in what capacity do they act against oppression? People can 
act alone in their resistance or they can act with others through collective action. And, they can 
resist oppression qua the particular individuals they are (i.e. “as me”, Tamara Fakhoury), or by 
acting in their capacity as a member or representative of a group or an organization (i.e. as 
president of organization X). Finally, the agents of resistance can stand in different relationships 
with the object of resistance. They can be direct victims of the oppression or they can be allies of 
people who are directly affected. Allies act against oppression on behalf of victims, and should 
prioritize victims’ values and interests when resisting. When oppressed persons resist, they 
ideally act to advance or express their own values and interests, or the values and interests of 
their social group.  
We can call resistance that is undertaken by individuals acting independently of others in 
their capacity as individuals individual resistance. We can call resistance that is undertaken by a 
group through joint, perhaps strategic, action collective resistance. A woman who insists on 
keeping her name when she gets married or decides to stop obsessively removing her body hair 
is engaged in a kind of individual resistance because she acts alone. While she could have the 
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support of her friends, her resistance is individual in the sense that she acts on her own and not in 
collaboration with a collective of other resistors working together towards a shared goal. A man 
who joins the Black Panthers and patrols the streets in black neighborhoods with a team of other 
Black Panthers to protect residents from police brutality is engaged in a kind of collective 
resistance. He doesn’t do it as an individual, but together with others as a member of the Black 
Panthers. Unlike resistance performed as an individual, which one undertakes independently of 
collaboration with others, collective acts of resistance are characteristically collaborative; they 
depend on strategic joint-action to achieve a shared goal.  
The Objects of Resistance: Private and Political Conditions   
The next set of categories I wish to introduce is distinguished according to the kind of thing 
that the act of resistance is aiming to push back against or change. Acts of resistance can aim to 
change conditions that are private and unlegislated, pertaining to a persons’ particular life and 
experiences. And, they can aim to change official codified conditions of the political 
administration. Hence, the object of their resistance—the thing the act aims to change or 
pressure—can be private or political. Private conditions consist of the informal and unlegislated 
effects of oppression that are often a part of the mainstream culture. Political conditions consist 
of oppressive parts of official, legislated, political administration, such as governmental laws and 
policies affecting entire groups, their official rights and liberties.  
Activists like MLK and Malcom X not only acted collectively with others to oppose 
racism and segregation in America (i.e. they resisted collectively), but they also sought to change 
specific laws and official procedures in the country’s administration. They wanted to change the 
law, as such, the object of their resistance was political. When a woman seeks to reduce the 
pressures on her children to be attracted to certain gendered forms of play, on the other hand, the 
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mother resists a private condition in the sense that she aims to reduce a specific unlegislated 
effect of oppression on her children’s private lives. She may not care about reducing similar 
effects on other children, or on changing the laws that allow businesses to market their toys in 
certain morally suspect ways. What makes the the object of her resistance private and not 
political is that she aims to change a specific informal and unlegislated effect of oppression on 
her and her daughters’ private lives.  
 By contrasting private conditions with political ones here, I do not wish to create the 
impression that the private sphere is not political, and vice versa. Rather, I wish to highlight a 
particular difference in the kinds of objects that a resistor might attempt to change. Sometimes, 
we might resist a straight-forwardly political object: we want to get rid of a particular law or 
rulers. Other times, we might resist a more private object: we want to get rid of the sexist 
pressures on our children to behave in certain ways that are harmful to them. Individuals and 
collectives can both take up private or political conditions as the object of their resistance. For 
example, while the mother who wishes to remove pressures on her children to engage in sexist 
forms of play engages in individual resistance against a private condition, we can imagine a 
collective of mothers working together to resist the same pressures on the children of the 
neighborhood. Unlike the mother who acts alone, the collective of mothers would be engaged in 
collective resistance against a private object (the informal cultural pressures on the neighborhood 
children to engage in sexist forms of play). Finally, we can imagine a political organization 
working to enforce official legal sanctions on the marketing strategies of corporations, the 
political organization would be engaged in collective resistance against a political condition, one 
with effects on the private conditions of individual children.  
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The Goals of Resistance: Global and Local Values and Interests  
A third distinction can be made according to what I’ll call the goal of the resistance. While 
the object of the resistance refers to the nature of the oppressive thing that the resistor opposes, 
the goal of resistance refers to what and whose values or interests are being expressed or 
represented by the effort to change or pressure the object. Individuals can resist the effects of 
oppression for the sake of particular individuals (e.g. themselves or their children) or for the sake 
of an entire social group, which they may or may not belong to (e.g. all women or blacks or 
people with disabilities). They might, in other words, represent local or global values or 
interests. Martin Luther King Jr. sought to resist racial oppression for the benefit of all blacks in 
America, and not just for himself. But he could have chosen not to lead a life of political 
advocacy, instead resisting only the racist limitations that affected him and his close associates. 
Since he aimed to benefit all Blacks in America, MLK was engaged in resistance with global 
interests—that is, resistance that advances and affirms the interests of an entire social group, and 
not merely select individuals within that social group.87 
 Alternatively, the mother from our earlier example seeks to reduce the effects of 
oppression on her daughters in particular. She might do so by buying them gender- neutral toys 
or encouraging them when they take an interest in traditionally male dominated activities. When 
she does this, the scope of her resistance is much more restricted than that of activists like 
MLK’s. She does not aspire to advance the global interests of the entire social group of female 
children, or express their values. She may not even think of the goal of her resistance as one that 
represents values she shares with other mothers and which she might advance for the benefit of 
                                                      
87 Ann Cudd calls this kind of resistance “distributive”. Cudd, “Strikes, Housework, and the 
Moral Obligation to Resist”, p.27. 
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other children. Her resistance has local interests; it is focused on bolstering the confidence and 
reducing the effects of stereotypes on a few select individuals, her children.88    
The Communicative Aspect of Resistance: Quiet and Loud 
There is one more distinction to be made. It seems to me that in addition to whether 
resistance is undertaken individually or collectively and whether it opposes political or private 
aspects of oppression, there are also distinct “tones” in which people resist oppression. 
Resistance that is undertaken individually or collectively, against political or private affairs can 
all be performed in a “loud” or “quiet” manner. Quiet and loud here should not be taken literally, 
as there are forms of loud resistance that are literally silent to the ears and there are forms of 
quiet resistance that are not. Activism is typically “loud” because it depends on making 
expressions of resistance to oppressor groups or other public audiences. Loud resistance always 
constitutes an attempt to communicate something to others. It might aim to surprise, offend, 
confuse, persuade, or send another powerful message.  
In contrast to resisting in a “loud” manner, people can also resist quietly. By “quiet” I 
don’t mean resistance that literally cannot be heard by anyone. Rather, I mean to mark a different 
contrast between certain forms of resistance and activism. Activism is intended to send loud and 
clear messages of resistance to the oppressor group or another public audience. In contrast, quiet 
resistance needn’t involve any communication or expression to any audience. Indeed, some quiet 
resistors may not care about politics. They might not care if anyone else gets the message that 
                                                      
88 Ann Cudd calls what I am calling local resistance “personal” resistance. Cudd, “Strikes, 
Housework, and the Moral Obligation to Resist”, p.27. 
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they are resisting. What matters to them is that they get to uphold or pursue a personal project, 
commitment, relationship, or ideal, oppression notwithstanding. 89   
Quiet resistors might even intentionally keep their resistance under wraps, so as to escape 
the oppressive situation or avoid serious backlash for resisting. This is what African slaves did 
when they broke their tools and played dumb in order to conspire against the slave masters. 
Surely, they would have been killed if their masters knew what they were up to. They kept their 
resistance under wraps in order to achieve personal goals that they were forbidden from 
pursuing. Other quiet resistors might want some people to get the message that they are 
rebelling—for instance, African slaves sometimes used songs to communicate with one another 
in code—but their resistance is still quiet in the sense that it was communicated to particular 
people in their vicinity without attempting to draw the attention of a public audience. So, 
resistance is quiet insofar as it does not constitute an attempt to make a blatant public expression 
of resistance or to engage the attention of public audiences. This differentiates quiet forms of 
resistance from activism, and especially paradigms of public protest, which involve sending 
blatant messages of resistance to entire groups of people.  The following table illustrates the 





                                                      
89 See Chapters 2 and 3 for the discussion of the nature and value of quiet resistance.   
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The Agents of Resistance 
 
Individuals:  





collaboratively with other 
resistors with a shared 
object and goal 
 
Allies 
Non-victims who resist for 
the sake of victims 
 
Victims 
Members of the oppressed 
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effects of oppression 
in the mainstream 
culture 
 
Political Conditions:  
effects of oppression 
that are officially 
codified in public law 
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in the interest of an 
entire social group  
 
The Communicative 
Aspects of Resistance  
 
Loud: aims to 
communicate resistance 
to oppressors or other 
public audiences  
 
Quiet: resistance that 
does not aim to make 




Gray Areas and Overlap  
Let’s consider some connections between the dimensions of resistance. The categories should 
not be taken as rigid divisions permitting of no overlap or gray-area. First consider the division 
between political conditions and private conditions, the distinction that pertains to the objects of 
resistance—the harm or injustice that the act of resistance aims to change or exert pressure 
against. It is widely accepted among social theorists that the line between the private and 
political spheres is blurry. Recall the feminist slogan “the personal is political!”. Reducing 
oppression in the political sphere will often mean alleviating some of its effects in private life 
and sometimes changes in private life are necessary for making changes in the public sphere. 
Protesting discriminatory laws can also be a way in which people attempt to push back against 
the private effects of oppression on their private lives. When Rosa Parks refused to give up her 
seat on the bus to a White man, she was both asserting her own self-respect as well as attempting 
to trigger large-scale political change. Amina Tyler’s resistance, too, seems neither merely 
politically targeted, nor merely privately targeted, but a bit of both. Amina Tyler was a Tunisian 
woman who posted a nude photograph of herself online with the phrase “my body is mine and 
not the source of anybody’s honor” painted across her skin in Arabic, provoking outrage in her 
Muslim community. She may not have been aiming to change any particular laws. But, she 
opposed a system of honor that is codified in the laws of many Muslim majority countries, in 
addition to having pervasive unlegislated effects on women’s private lives including her own. 
Her resistance targeted both political and private aspects of oppression at once. 
Although political and private targets may overlap, the distinction is still illuminating. 
The object of the resistance—whether it is a political or private affair—will bear relevantly on its 
value. Moreover, there are cases where the two objects come cleanly apart. That is, where the 
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resistor is really only aiming to liberate themselves or a select few individuals (recall the mother 
who encourages gender-neutral forms of play but has no interest in taking political action or 
helping other children), and cases where the resistor aims only to change the law (corrupt 
immigration laws might never harm you personally, but you might still resist them by lobbying 
or writing a letter to your governor about it). Indeed, there are effects of oppression that we have 
to resist by focusing on changing private affairs—internalized body shaming, for instance, can’t 
be eliminated if we don’t work to change our attitudes. And there are aspects of oppression that 
we have to resist by focusing on political affairs, corrupt legislation, for instance, can’t be 
changed if we only ever focus on changing our attitudes.   
Privately targeted resistance can be taken up individually (by oneself) or collectively 
(with others). The same goes for politically targeted resistance. One can resist political 
administration, by breaking a law (politically targeted resistance).90 One can individually resist 
oppression in the private sphere (privately targeted resistance) by opting out of disempowering 
lifestyles, distancing oneself from certain members of the oppressor group, educating oneself 
about theories of oppression, or creating subversive artwork. One can engage in collective and 
privately targeted resistance—that is, resistance undertaken collaboratively with others against 
effects of oppression on one’s private life—by attending feminist support groups or putting on 
the Vagina Monologues. One can engage in collectively undertaken and politically targeted 
resistance—that is, resistance undertaken collaboratively with others against political 
administration—by attending a Women’s March or participating in a worker’s strike. 
 Collective resistance need not always be aimed at a political administration. For instance, 
in the Underground Railroad, Harriet Tubman sought to liberate willing slaves by giving them an 
                                                      
90 I’m assuming that one does this without strategizing or acting collectively with others.  
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escape route. She worked collaboratively with a network of antislavery activists and safe houses 
to reduce the effects of oppression on others. Although her resistance was performed in 
collaboration with allies, it was not a direct attempt to change the law. Rather, it aimed to 
enhance the private lives of those African Americans who were willing to try to escape slavery. 
Moreover, it was crucial that she keep the project “underground” and out of sight of officials so 
it could not be sabotaged.    
Now consider the relationships between the “loud” and “quiet” features of resistance and 
other dimensions. Loud resistance is frequently politically targeted and collectively undertaken. 
But resistance that is individually undertaken and aimed at private effects of oppression can also 
be loud. Political protests are a kind of loud and collective resistance. If they aim to change the 
law or political administration they are politically targeted. If they aim to empower and promote 
solidarity, like Pride marches do, they are loud, collective, and targeted at unlegislated effects of 
oppression in the mainstream culture. Going into a fit of anger and screaming at one’s family 
over having always to do all the housework is a kind of loud resistance that is both individually 
undertaken and privately targeted. Wearing clothing with provocative political statements 
(“Pussy Grabs Back!” or “Bad Hombre”) can be a way of loudly resisting a political effect of 
oppression, but it can also be a way of loudly resisting the private effects of injustices in political 
administration, for instance, by loudly expressing one’s self- respect. Exhibiting one’s 
provocative artwork can be a way of loudly and individually resisting oppression’s effects on 
one’s private life. It can even be a way of protesting oppressive laws and administration, 
depending on the content of the artwork. Amina Tyler’s resistance was loud, individually 
undertaken, and targeted both political and private aspects of oppression. 
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Quiet resistance is often privately targeted and individually undertaken, but it need not 
always be. Women in Saudi Arabia resist quietly and individually by wearing bright colored nail 
polish to the mall in spite of the risk that the morality police will reprimand them for it.  A 
person can quietly resist political administration by breaking the law in a manner that doesn’t 
aim to draw attention. The women on Obama’s staff quietly resisted workplace sexism through 
collective action by using the “amplification” strategy of repeating each other’s ideas and 
crediting the women who came up with them during staff meetings.     
 Resistance that aims to advance or uphold the global interests of an entire social group 
need not always be aimed at a political target. A martial arts instructor who uploads instructional 
videos on YouTube designed to teach women to evade sexual assault is engaged in resistance of 
a global scope—she aims to advance the interests of all women. But her resistance does not aim 
to change public laws and administration, her goal is instead to arm women with self- defense 
techniques.   
 Quiet, individually undertaken, privately targeted resistance that aims to uphold local 
interests is the most difficult to identify in the real world. On the other hand, many cases of 
resistance that we have clear intuitions about are examples of loud, collective, politically targeted 
resistance that aim to advance global interests. These features are characteristic of activism.  
In sum, an adequate theory of resistance to oppression should account for not only the 
clear and explicit cases of resistance to oppression, like political activism, but also for resistance 
in its less obvious yet everyday forms. Here I have described a series of features that can be used 
to differentiate acts of resistance to oppression. This work can serve as a starting point for 
developing inclusive philosophical theories of resistance to oppression that are grounded in 





CHAPTER FIVE: BECOMING A REBEL: A SKETCH OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESISTOR 
 
“To be a feminist, one has first to become one. For many feminists, this involves the 
experience of a profound personal transformation, an experience which goes far beyond that 
sphere of human activity we regard ordinarily as “political.” This transforming 
experience…is complex and multi-faceted. In the course of undergoing the transformation to 
which I refer, the feminist changes her behavior: she makes new friends; she responds 
differently to people and events; her habits of consumption change; sometimes she alters her 
living arrangements or, more dramatically, her whole style of life. She may decide to pursue 
a career, to develop potentialities within herself which had long lain dormant or she may 
commit herself to political struggle.”—Sandra Bartky91 
 
Bartky’s quote suggests that one is not born a feminist but becomes one by growing 
conscious of social injustice and making an effort to transform oneself into a more liberated 
person.  Hence, being a feminist is not merely a matter of championing a certain political cause, 
but requires making deep, personal life-changes, of the sort Bartky describes. Similarly, I take it, 
one is not born a resistor of oppression, but becomes one through a process of personal 
transformation. And, as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, being a resistor of 
oppression is not merely a matter of defending a political cause, but can also involve quiet 
resistance.   
Previously, I argued that persons may engage in quiet resistance without thinking of their 
acts as acts of resistance to oppression as such. It strikes me that people can act against 
oppression (or fail to act against it) with various kinds of attitudes and levels of consciousness of 
oppression. I would like to close the dissertation with a very preliminary sketch of several stages 
in the psychological development of the resistor. At one end of the spectrum is non-resistance. 
                                                      
91 Sandra Bartky, “Towards a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness”, p. 1. 
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At the other end is what I will call moral rebelliousness. I will suggest that moral rebelliousness 
is admirable, and worth striving for. Moral rebels’ opposition to social injustice is better 
integrated into their character and outlook on the world. This is better than having one’s 
opposition to oppressive harms be a source of inner conflict, ambivalence, or unintelligible 
outbursts.  
I will trace the following stages of development. Note that people may never go through all 
the stages on the spectrum. And, there may be stages that I have not accounted for here (for 
instance, collaboration and compliance with oppression may also be stages worth exploring. I 
will bracket them for now).  Readers be warned that what follows is a very preliminary sketch. 
The ideas in this chapter need development, but I must leave this task for another time.  
1. Non-resistance due to Ignorance 
2. Inchoate Proto-Resistance 
3. Ambivalent or Conflicted Resistance 
4. Moral Rebelliousness 
Non-resistance Due to Ignorance 
The first stage on the developmental spectrum is nonresistance. A common cause for non-
resistance is ignorance about the harms of oppression or about the significance of one’s 
responses to them. Someone who fails to resist due to ignorance about oppression might never 
learn about oppression, or they may never notice the oppressive harms before them. They may 
have internalized oppression to the point that they perceive oppressive harms as natural, 
inevitable, or ordained by God.  Or, they may find other rationalizations. For instance, they 
might write off oppressive harms as the results of misfortune or the personal demerits and 
failures of those who suffer them, failing to see them as parts of a system.  
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Another way ignorance can contribute to non-resistance is when a person thinks they are 
resisting oppression when they are actually not resisting it. They might not be faced with real 
oppression, but nevertheless believe that they are. For instance, members of the men’s movement 
are not resisting oppression when they refuse to pay child support because they claim domestic 
laws are unjustly biased towards women.92 No matter what they may believe, in the present 
world men are not oppressed by their gender, so men cannot resist their own gender oppression.  
Alternatively, the would-be-resistor may be faced with real oppression, but may not be 
resisting it in the manner that they think they are. For instance, they may be deceived about their 
motivations.  Roger Gottlieb calls this “self-deceptive nonresistance”. To illustrate, Gottlieb 
provides the example of the Judenrat during the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Judenrat were a 
council of usually wealthy and influential Jews who became responsible for deportations to death 
camps and the day-to-day administration of the ghettos. Many of them claimed to be protecting 
other Jews by minimizing the harms that would have been done to the Jewish population had 
non-Jews been responsible for administering the ghettos. Gottlieb claims that it was clear that 
they were deceiving themselves,     
Members of the Judenrat often opposed, sometimes even betrayed, militant resistance 
groups. Yet members of the Judenrat usually expressed the belief that they were engaged 
in an intelligent and effective strategy of resistance, that their surface cooperation was 
part of a larger strategy of saving as many Jewish lives as possible…Despite their claims 
to the contrary, however, it is clear that in some instances members of the Judenrat were 
not telling the truth about their intentions…they sought self-protection at the expense of 
fellow Jews…They were not engaged in a resistance effort which was shaped by different 
beliefs than those possessed by the militants. Rather, they were not resisting at all. 
 
                                                      
92 Cudd (2006) p. 189.  
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Gottlieb thinks that resistance can never have self-serving motives.93 He is confident that the 
Judenrat were “not resisting at all” because they had self-serving motives and they were self-
deceived about them. Unlike Gottlieb, I am not so confident that the Judenrat were not resisting, 
because I think self-preservation can be a strong motivator for resistance. Moreover, the fact that 
someone is deceived about their true motives is not, for me, sufficient to say that they were not 
resisting. It seems right, however, to say that while the Judenrat may be resisting in some sense 
(we’d have to look closely at specific cases), some Judenrat may have been deceiving themselves 
that they were engaged in the same kind of resistance as the militants, or that their resistance had 
the same goals, when it did not. Perhaps they were, due to a lack of self-knowledge, not resisting 
politically, as they thought they were. Hence their political nonresistance was due to ignorance 
about their motives.   
Inchoate Proto-Resistance 
The next stage in the development of the resistor to oppression is inchoate proto-resistance. 
Inchoate proto-resistance is unprincipled, erratic, unarticulated, and lacks understanding. It tends 
to find expression in temporary bursts of antagonism against authority figures or oppressive 
situations. Some of the suburban housewives that Betty Friedan interviews in The Feminine 
Mystique can be said to be inchoately proto-resisting their oppression. Friedan wrote at a time 
when intellectuals and activists were first starting to develop and use the concept of oppression 
and when the word “sexism” did not have any presence in ordinary life (the term “sexism” was 
coined in the late 1960s). As Friedan reports, some women experiencing “the problem that has 
no name” (i.e. sexism) were prone to fits of incessant crying or screaming. Sometimes they slept 
too much, neglected chores, or ignored family members. Sometimes they burst into inexplicable 
                                                      
93 Gottlieb, “The Concept of Resistance”, p. 45.  
 91 
rage at their husbands or children. Other times they abruptly stormed out of their homes to walk 
alone through the streets.94 When asked what the problem was, the women reported living 
perfect lives, having all the things happy women should have- health, fine children, a lovely 
home, enough money, hard-working husbands (“what more could a woman want from life?”).95 
Their emotional distress tended to be dismissed as a mere bodily inconvenience, like a cold or a 
headache. Their husbands suggested going on vacation. Psychiatrists prescribed tranquilizers.96    
It is common for women who are just starting to become conscious of their gender 
oppression to feel contempt, anger, anxiety, boredom, lack of fulfillment and depression without 
conceptualizing or being able to identify the object of their despair. What Friedan’s suburban 
housewives suggest is that women felt resistant emotions regarding their oppressive treatment 
well before they were capable of resisting it, (which, on my view, requires the ability to 
conceptualize the treatment they were receiving as bad or unjust).    
Ambivalent Resistance 
A further stage in the development of the resistor to oppression is ambivalent resistance. In 
figurative terms, to be ambivalent is to be “of two minds”. In ambivalent resistance, the agent 
resists oppression but does so with some reluctance, inner conflict, or irresolution. The 
ambivalence may mean having conflicting beliefs and emotions. For instance, a man may 
genuinely believe that calling his friends out when they objectify women is the right thing to do, 
but he may also really enjoy the machismo give-and-take that happens when they do so. In spite 
of the enjoyment he might get if he were to play along, he may still tell his friends to stop. If he 
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does that his resistance is ambivalent—or perhaps, more accurately, “conflicted”—because it 
occurs against a backdrop of a temptation to join in on the fun. 
Alternatively, the ambivalence may consist in having contradictory attitudes or beliefs 
about resisting oppression. Consider many so-called “right-wing women”. As Superson describes 
them, “right-wing women” are women who have the same attitudes about women as sexist men 
do and “whose lifestyles by and large reflect right- wing values for the reason that they believe 
women belong in stereotypical roles”.97 Some of these women may believe that it is the 
husband’s job to provide for the family and the wife’s career should always come second to 
caring for the home. And yet, they may also believe that they deserve to pursue their careers and 
to have their husbands’ help in the home. They may even demand that they pursue the careers 
they want thereby opposing the very gender stereotypes they believe in.    
Another instance of ambivalent resistance that involves conflicting attitudes or beliefs is 
how during slavery “many individual slaves had the false conscious belief that blacks are inferior 
to whites, yet still felt that their treatment by their owner was unjust” and resisted by trying to 
escape.98 Their attempts at escaping are instances of ambivalent resistance because although they 
felt their treatment as slaves was unjust, they still took themselves to be naturally subordinate to 
whites and behaved in a manner that reflected that.   
Ambivalent resistance is common in women who are newly developing consciousness of 
their gender oppression. Before their opposition to oppression has become integrated in their 
psychologies, they may still possess certain habits of feeling and thinking that conflict with their 
feminist values. For instance, a woman may feel the responsibility to speak up and make her 
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views known to others, yet still struggle with deep and debilitating anxiety over whether what 
she has to say is worthy. Such women may deliberately strive to resist the anxiety and she may 
understand her struggle as ultimately a struggle with oppression. She may have some of the 
character traits of the mature feminist, but still retain some character traits of the submissive non- 
resistor. As such, her resistance is not yet a cohesive or well- integrated part of herself.  
Since the mechanisms of oppression are so deeply internalized and rooted in our 
psychologies and social fabric, it is very difficult to get beyond the stage of ambivalent (or in 
some cases it may be more accurate to say “conflicted” resistance). Many of us never do. 
Reaching this stage at all is an achievement.  
Moral Rebelliousness 
When you imagine a rebel you might think of an angsty adolescent, a troublemaker, the 
character played by James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause, or Holden Caulfield in The Catcher 
in the Rye. We typically think of the rebel as someone who lacks respect for certain kinds of 
rules and power dynamics. The rebel is a kind of nonconformist, someone not easily handled or 
kept in place. She insists on resisting authority, control and convention and refuses to just go 
along. Rebelliousness is not limited to reactively rejecting various norms and systems of 
authority. Rebels can also be innovators of unconventional values and lifestyles, and respond 
creatively to injustice. When our current values and lifestyles are deeply mired in oppressive 
ideologies, a certain kind of rebelliousness—one that involves strategically bending and breaking 
the mores and rules of oppression—can be admirable.     
A Moral Rebel is a rebel who resists oppressive authority, control and convention 
because she perceives them as morally abhorrent (they need not have a sophisticated 
understanding of oppression, or act under the description of resisting oppression, they may be 
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quiet resistors).  The Moral Rebel endorses her resistance. She resists wisely, deliberately and 
without unfitting confliction. Moreover, her actions do not oppose oppression by accident; they 
reflect a cultivated and psychologically well-integrated commitment that she has to defying what 
she takes to be wrong—and to living up to her personal standards and ideals.      
Albert Camus’ philosophy presupposes certain metaphysical claims about the 
meaningfulness of human existence that we may or may not want to accept. Nevertheless, I find 
his discussion of rebelliousness in The Rebel really interesting and useful for inspiring discussion 
of this idea of the Moral Rebel. For Camus, the rebel is a person who finds value within herself 
and resolves to live (or die) for that value.99 Describing the rebel, Camus states, 
What is a rebel? A man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation. He 
is also a man who says yes from the moment he makes his first gesture of rebellion. A 
slave who has taken orders all his life suddenly decides that he cannot obey some new 
command…Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that, somewhere and somehow, 
one is right…the rebel… says yes and no simultaneously… In every act of rebellion, the 
rebel simultaneously experiences a feeling of revulsion at the infringement of his rights 
and a complete and spontaneous loyalty to certain aspects of himself.100 
 
Camus goes on to explain what it means for the rebel to say no and yes simultaneously in 
their rebellion. I will only say a little about it here, and only in comparison with the Moral Rebel. 
Like Camus’ rebel, in saying no to oppressive authority and convention, the Moral Rebel 
“affirms the existence of a borderline” which the oppressor may not cross. The borderline is self-
respect. In doing this the rebel simultaneously “demonstrates, with obstinacy, that there is 
something in [her] which “is worth while… and which must be taken into consideration”. That 
is, she demonstrates that she is a moral equal and affirms the aspect of her humanity she shares 
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with others. Or, she demonstrates that she is an individual with talents and traits that are 
valuable, and affirms the aspect of her humanity that makes her special.  
Camus further describes his rebel as someone who internalizes their resistance such that 
it becomes a part of their identity. Similarly, my Moral Rebel does not merely resist, but she 
resists wholeheartedly and affirmatively. She lives by her resistance. Her resistance is 
assimilated into her character such that she makes her freedom a priority.  
The act of rebellion carries [the rebel] far beyond the point he had reached by simply 
refusing. He exceeds the bounds that he fixed for his antagonist, and now demands to be 
treated as an equal. What was at first the man’s obstinate resistance now becomes the 
whole man, who is identified with and summed up in this resistance. The part of himself 
that he wanted to be respected he proceeds to place above everything else.101 
 
Who are the Moral Rebels of our world? They are people who live by their commitment 
to resist. They resist oppression deliberately and with moral understanding and without 
reluctance or second thoughts. They may have struggled to rid themselves of reluctance or 
second thoughts, but their resistance has matured past (perhaps through) the stages of inchoate, 
inadvertent, and ambivalent resistance. Moral Rebels may occasionally struggle with conflicting 
beliefs and emotions regarding their oppression- they are not perfect- but for the most part they 
have a harmonious psyche with regards to resisting oppression. They may or may not be engaged 
in loud public forms of resistance. They may be ordinary people we know. Or they may be 
extraordinary people like Malala Yousafzai, Maya Angelou, and James Baldwin.  
Finally, I want to say something about why moral rebelliousness may be preferable to the 
other phases.102 Given that the oppressed have good reasons to resist their oppression and they 
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are morally justified if they choose to do so, it is better for them and for others they interact with 
to resist wholeheartedly, with proper understanding, and with a minimum of internal conflict. 
The least that can be said to support this point is that having an understanding of one’s 
oppression and one’s options for resistance (even if limited) seems intrinsically valuable as a 
kind of knowledge of oneself and one’s social environment. Moreover, resisting wholeheartedly 
seems to reflect greater integrity, on both a self- integration and a standing for something account 
of integrity.103  
Inchoate resistors are worse off than Moral Rebels because their resistance is superficial, 
underdeveloped, and unassimilated into their character. For starters, the inchoate resistor fails to 
understand their outbursts or resistant emotions. They may never consider where their avoidance, 
anger, bitterness or contempt for authority comes from and what those episodes reveal anything 
about them or their social context. They might explain oppressive harms away as bad luck or 
personal defects. Moral Rebels, on the other hand, know that what they oppose is an injustice 
and that they have a right to push back against it.    
Resistors who are ambivalent or conflicted have beliefs, emotions, character traits or 
values that are in conflict with their opposition to oppressive harms. This can be cognitively 
disruptive and disorienting. The ambivalent resistor is conflicted. She refuses to go along with 
her oppression while at the same time desiring to go along with it. This will seep into her 
relationships and social interactions.  For instance, she may desire that her friends and family 
uphold the same oppressive conventions that she ambivalently rejects. Or, she may believe that 
she ought to be respected as an equal while at the same time feeling that she is less worthy than 
others.  The rebellious resistor is better off for having minimal reservations about their 
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resistance. Moreover, in resisting whole- heartedly, she shows more genuine respect for herself 
or others who are oppressed.   
In ideal circumstances, no one would have to cultivate rebelliousness to maintain and 
express integrity and self-respect. In a society where conventions and systems of power are 


















An adequate theory of resistance to oppression should account for not only the clear and 
explicit cases of resistance to oppression, like political activism, but also for resistance in its less 
obvious yet everyday forms. Against common assumptions that (1) valuable resistance to 
oppression always involves explicit and public condemnation of a wrong or injustice, and (2) It 
takes concrete steps to rouse desirable social and political change. I have argued there is a kind 
of resistance to oppression, which I call quiet resistance, that diverges significantly from political 
activism, and is easy to overlook when we focus our attention exclusively on paradigms of 
political activism. As I have defined it, it involves defying oppressive situations—and accepting 
the risks of doing so—in order to pursue or uphold a project, preference, relationship, 
commitment, or ideal.   
I have argued that quiet resistance is a valuable form of resistance to oppression, 
independently of whether it is, or aims to be, effective in producing desirable social or political 
change. Namely, Quiet resistance is an expression of one’s refusal to be unjustly stopped from 
living a life that represents who one is and what one cares about. However, I do not think that 
quiet resistance is merely symbolic. Through quiet resistance, individuals don’t merely express 
their allegiances, they do things—they live out their values and fulfill their preferences in a 
context where they are unjustly forbidden from doing so. As such, quiet resistance is an 
enactment of one’s self-respect and courage, and sometimes it can be a source of meaning in life. 
The idea of quiet resistance reveals two things about resistance to oppression in general: 
First, we do not need to conceive of our acts as defying oppression as such—as activists do—in 
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order for them to be ways in which we resist oppression. Second, there are strong reasons to 
resist oppression independently of attempting to reduce the oppression, expressing one’s outrage 
over it, or advancing political or humanitarian causes.  
Finally, although I have been focused here on resistance to oppression in particular, the 
concept of quiet resistance may have applications beyond this context. People can quietly resist 
social authority of different kinds, and they can do so in morally commendable and morally 
condemnable ways. Consider school kids quietly resisting by turning the clock hands forward 
while their teacher turns their back to write on the board, or teenagers quietly resisting their 
parents by violating curfew. Moreover, my arguments have implications for practical philosophy 
more generally. Basically, I think the scope of moral evaluation extends beyond actions that 
constitute attempts to promote the common good. There are morally valuable acts that are not 
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